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JUDGING GIFT RULES BY THEIR WRAPPINGS-
TOWARDS A CLEARER ARTICULATION




Edward Gibbon, the renowned historian of ancient Rome, would not
have been surprised to learn of modern-day America's political scandals.
"Corruption," he observed, is "the most infallible symptom of constitu-
tional liberty."'
Despite Gibbon's observations, there is little danger that Americans
today will embrace corruption as a sign of democratic virtue or permit
their officials wear it as a badge of honor. Particularly in recent years, the
nation has focused its attention continually on the ethical climate of gov-
ernment. Its concerns are well placed. Official misconduct corrodes
democratic structures. In a democracy, public servants frustrate the na-
tion's policies and goals when they fail to serve the public interest.' Even
the appearance of misconduct can be as damaging as the reality. As the
Supreme Court has pointed out, "a democracy is effective only if the peo-
ple have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered
when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse
suspicions of malfeasance and corruption."3
* A.B. Wesleyan University; J.D. Harvard Law School; member of the Connecticut
Bar. Mr. Zinman is with the Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Labor.
The views expressed in this article do not reflect the views of the Department of Labor or
the United States Government.
1. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 706 (1950)
(footnote omitted).
2. See SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS, Assoc. OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE, 6-7 (1960)
[hereinafter NEW YORK BAR STUDY]; Tenth Anniversary of the Ethics in Government Act
and Reauthorization of the Office of Government Ethics: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1988)) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Archibald Cox, Chairman,
Common Cause).
3. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961).
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Good ethics rules do not ensure good government, but they are a cru-
cial prerequisite. Writing such rules is not an easy task. It is not enough
that ethics rules reflect sound, wise, and practical value judgments. The
success of the entire enterprise depends upon the skill with which authors
draft these rules. Complexity and ambiguity are the twin hobgoblins of
comprehension, and the public cannot expect officials to obey a code they
do not understand.
A confusing ethics code can undermine the functions of democratic
government in a less obvious way. It can create reasonable fear that an
entirely proper official action will place the employee in legal jeopardy.
The most ethically sensitive and informed employees often are those
most likely to succumb to this fear.
It was just this concern over the in terrorem effects of personal liability
that led to the doctrine of qualified immunity of government officials for
tortious acts related to their government duties.4 The rationale for the
immunity doctrine is that government officials will be immobilized if they
fear liability for every action which is later found to exceed their statutory
authority.5 The immunity doctrine absolves government officials from
personal responsibility in private suits for some illegal actions arising out
4. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988).
5. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, explained the rationale of the im-
munity doctrine:
The purpose of such official immunity is not to protect an erring official, but to
insulate the decisionmaking process from the harassment of prospective litigation.
The provision of immunity rests on the view that the threat of liability will make
federal officials unduly timid in carrying out their official duties, and that effective
Government will be promoted if officials are freed of the costs of vexatious and
often frivolous damages suits.
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988).
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of their official duties.6 Moreover, the Justice Department may represent
the government official in court.7
A government official who faces the alleged violation of an ethics regu-
lation confronts a very different predicament. No doctrine of immunity
shields the official from the consequences of ethical infractions which are
close to the line.8 Every breach is deemed to be a violation of the offi-
cial's public trust. When an official is charged with an ethics violation, the
government acts as the prosecutor, rather than the defense.9 The stakes
6. Westfall, 484 U.S. at 295. The United States Supreme Court has held that: "abso-
lute immunity does not shield official functions from state-law tort liability unless the chal-
lenged conduct is within the outer perimeter of an official's duties and is discretionary in
nature." Id. at 300.
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978), the Court held that only a qualified
immunity, rather than an absolute immunity, extends to most suits alleging constitutional
violations. Id.
In 1988, Congress, responding to what it perceived as an erosion of the immunity for
common law tort, enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensa-
tion Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-79 (1988)). The Act provides that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), government liability for injuries resulting
from negligent or wrongful acts of federal government employees acting within the scope
of their employment is exclusive. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
Act also bars action against the employee. Id. §§ 2676, 2679(b)(1). Under the 1988 law,
the United States substitutes for the government employee as the defendant in appropriate
cases. Id. § 2679(d)(1). The statute does not apply to actions against employees alleging
violations of the Constitution or those authorized by statute. Id. § 2679(b)(2)(A).
7. See Defense of Certain Suits Against Federal Employees, 28 C.F.R. § 15.1 (1993).
8. In deciding whether to seek punitive action, and in gauging what punishment is
appropriate, the government may take into account the se'erity of the violation, the clarity
of the rule, and the good faith of the employee. See Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5
M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).
New Justice Department regulations governing the contact of its lawyers with unrepre-
sented persons have the effect of granting limited immunity under state disciplinary rules
for non-willful violations of the new rules. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 77.12).
State ethics rules generally bar certain contact between lawyers and non-lawyers. The
new Justice Department regulations establish specified department-wide standards gov-
erning these attorney contacts and preempt the application of state laws and the local rules
of the federal courts. Id. at 39,929-31. The new regulations only allow state authorities to
discipline Justice Department lawyers when the Attorney General finds that the attorney
willfully violated the new Justice Department rules. Id. at 39,931. While the Justice De-
partment still may punish non-willful violations, the attorney, in effect, is immunized from
prosecution under local disciplinary procedures, even though the conduct violates both
Federal and state rules. Id.
9. Under the Ethics in Government Act the court may authorize payment of various
expenses to a person subject to an independent counsel investigation if the investigation
does not result in an indictment. 28 U.S.C. § 593(f) (1988). Congress added this provision
to the Ethics in Government Act by an Act on January 3, 1983. Act of Jan. 3, 1983, § 5,
Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039, 2041 (1983) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 593(f) (1988)).
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for the accused are very high: criminal prosecution, loss of employment,
or serious damage to reputation and career.
Thus, when ethically sensitive employees face confusing ethics rules
bearing on imminent future actions, they must make important decisions.
There are several possibilities.
First, they can seek legal advice before taking action. The adequacy of
this option depends on the resources available to provide definitive and
timely guidance. A complex or ambiguous ethics code can overload em-
ployee guidance systems and render them incapable of producing a re-
sponse that meets agency and employee needs.
Second, employees can reject all choices that raise ethics questions.
This option may require employees to dismiss beneficial alternatives that
are entirely proper. It is acceptable only if the employees' ultimate deci-
sions serve the public interest as well as the lawful choices which they
rejected. Otherwise, the ambiguities in the ethics rules, in effect, will
cause employees to defy the principle underlying most ethics codes-that
the public interest must govern employees' official behavior."0 The em-
ployees' actions are not unlike those of physicians who prescribe unnec-
essary tests to protect against malpractice suits.
Third, employees can do nothing. This option is a more severe and
dramatic version of option two.
Finally, employees can ignore the pervasive ethical uncertainties,
thereby avoiding interference with the speed and efficiency of decision
making. This option obliges ethical employees to desensitize themselves.
It requires, in effect, a reenactment of the "see no evil, hear no evil"
tableau in which the most ethically sensitive employee plays the role of
the Monkey-in-Chief.
The public would like to believe that ethics codes have consequences,
and they do. A carefully balanced and artfully crafted code helps pre-
serve and protect the fundamental democratic values on which our sys-
tem of government is based. An ill-conceived or poorly drafted code
often can do "more harm than good."'1
With these considerations in mind, one may wonder about the efflores-
cence of ethical codes and standards marking the closing years of the
1980s and the dawn of the 1990s. Since 1988, Congress has enacted an
10. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a)-(b) (1994).
11. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Quest for Equality in Regulating the Behavior of Gov-
ernment Officials: The Case of Extrajudicial Compensation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 488,
491 (1990).
[Vol. 44:141
1994] Judging Gift Rules by Their Wrappings
array of amendments to the Ethics in Government Act. 2 It has passed
procurement integrity legislation and has gone forward with a confusing
flurry of amendments, suspensions, and reinstatements of the Act.
13
Agencies have issued detailed regulations to interpret its provisions.'
4
Presidents have signed four Executive Orders dealing with ethics mat-
ters. 5 The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has promulgated de-
tailed rules governing financial disclosure, qualified trusts, and
certificates of divestiture for Executive Branch employees.' 6 It also has
published regulations describing limitations on outside employment and
honoraria,' 7 and requiring agencies to establish extensive employee train-
12. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2,5, 18,28, and 39 U.S.C.). The post-1988 amendments
include: Technical and Miscellaneous Civil Service Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
378, § 4, 106 Stat. 1346, 1356-58 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 31-2, note and scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. app.); Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
90, § 314, 105 Stat. 447, 469-70 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 2, 26 U.S.C.
and 5 U.S.C. app.); The Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 2, 5, 10, 18, 22, 26, 28, 31, 42, 50 U.S.C. and 5
U.S.C. app.); The Act of May 4, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-280, 104 Stat. 149 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 10, 18, 22, 26, 31 U.S.C. and 5 U.S.C. app.); Act of
Dec. 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 6, 105 Stat. 1623, 1624 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 5 U.S.C. app.); Treasury, Postal Service and General Gov-
ernment Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-509, § 529, 104 Stat. 1389, 1440-41
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 207); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 609.
106 Stat. 1828, 1873 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 207); Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101 -650, §§ 319, 405, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117, 5124 (codified as amended at
§§ 5 U.S.C. app. 502 104(b)); Veterans' Benefits Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
237, § 602, 103 Stat. 2062, 2094-95 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. 302, 308).
13. In November, 1988, Congress added new procurement integrity provisions to the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act. Pub. L. No. 100-679, § 6, 102 Stat. 4055. 4063-
68 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 423). Congress amended these provisions with the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189,
§ 814, 103 Stat. 1352, 1495-1500 (1989). The Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
194, § 507, 103 Stat. 1716, 1759 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 423 note), later sus-
pended the provisions for the period of December 1, 1989 through November 30, 1990.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 815,
104 Stat. 1485, 1597 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 41, 42 U.S.C.),
further suspended the post-employment restrictions through May 31, 1991. Finally, Con-
gress restored the Act, effective January 1, 1991, through the Persian Gulf Conflict Supple-
mental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-25, § 705(a),
105 Stat. 75, 120 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 423).
14. 48 C.F.R. §§ 3.101 to .204 (1994).
15. Exec. Order No. 12,834,3 C.F.R. 580 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12,674, 3 C.F.R. 215
(1990), revised by Exec. Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991); Exec. Order No. 12,668, 3
C.F.R. 210 (1989).
16. Executive Branch Financial Disclosure, Qualified Trusts, and Certificates of Di-
vestiture, 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.101 to .1004 and appendices (1994).
17. Limitations on Outside Employment and Prohibition of Honoraria; Confidential
Reporting of Payments to Charities in Lieu of Honoraria, 5 C.F.R. §§ 2636.101 to .307
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ing programs. 8 The General Services Administration (GSA) also has
been involved, setting forth detailed guidelines concerning the authority
of agencies to accept payment from outside sources for the travel-related
expenses of agency employees. 19
Without doubt, the "800 pound gorilla" of all ethics rule changes is the
OGE's new government-wide ethics code which became effective on Feb-
ruary 3, 1993.20 This code is especially important because it covers virtu-
ally every aspect of employee conduct and replaces existing agency
standards which have been in effect since the mid-1960s.
For those who believe that the form and substance of ethics rules can
profoundly affect the ability of democratic government to carry out its
mission, these recent changes should be matters of intense interest. This
article closely inspects the strengths and failings of the new government-
wide code, particularly its provisions limiting gifts to government employ-
ees from sources outside the government. It begins with a brief review of
earlier ethics regulation efforts to place the new code in historical pro-
spective. This article then analyzes the new code's specific provisions and
compares them to the older regulations restricting gifts to government
employees. Finally, this article offers recommendations and conclusions
as to how the drafters of ethics codes can achieve competing goals in
ethics regulation.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE NEW CODE
A series of influence-peddling scandals during the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury prompted the first serious federal effort to regulate conflicts of inter-
est.21 Except for the broadest of the new laws, the predecessor to 18
U.S.C. § 208, Congress narrowly focused the resulting criminal statutes to
remedy specific forms of misbehavior.22
(1994). Employees challenged these regulations in National Treasury Employees Union v.
United States, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994), and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the regulations by
ruling that they were unconstitutional. Id. at 1277. The Supreme Court struck down the
ban on February 22, 1995. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 63
U.S.L.W. 4133 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1995).
18. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.701 to .703 (1994).
19. 41 C.F.R. §§ 304-1.1 to 1.9 (1994).
20. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R.
§§ 2635.101 to .902 (1994). These were the final regulations covering the ethical conduct of
Executive Branch personnel.
21. See NEW YORK BAR STUDY, supra note 2, at 29-59 (providing a historical exposi-
tion on early conflict-of-interest statutes).
22. Unlike other conflict-of-interest statutes, § 208 is a very broad provision prohibit-
ing federal employees from participating in official matters which affect their own financial
interests or the interest of other designated related parties. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Supp. V
[Vol. 44:141
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Prior to the 1960s, neither Congress nor the Executive Branch gave
much sustained attention to ethics regulation. 23 The Civil Service Com-
mission had not published general guidelines to implement the conflict-
of-interest laws, and agency regulation was desultory at best. Only the
Department of Justice demonstrated an aggressive interest in govern-
ment-wide ethics matters, arising principally from its role in the presiden-
tial appointment process and its enforcement of the criminal laws. This
activity, however, was insufficient to compensate for a general lack of
central direction within the Executive branch.24 Congress issued a broad
statement of ethics principles in 1958, but it included no enforcement
provisions.25
In 1962, Congress extensively revised the conflict-of-interest laws.
Although the amendments were significant, they represented evolution-
ary change, rather than a shift to a more pervasive regulatory environ-
ment.26 It is not surprising that these reforms were so modest. In the
early 1960s, the government faced new ethical challenges, which were
seen to arise from forces outside of the bureaucracy and not from any
fundamental pathology of the institution itself. The new law responded,
in part, to some well-publicized instances of misconduct,27 but in the view
of President Kennedy, "the few instances of official impropriety" did not
betoken a "widespread departure from high standards of ethics and
moral conduct., 28
One of the primary concerns of the new conflict-of-interest law was the
increasing governmental presence of experts whose principal economic
1993). The statute does not include a de minimis exception, but it does permit waivers
under appropriate circumstances. See id. The earliest of the conflict-of-interest statutes,
the predecessor to the present 18 U.S.C. § 205, enacted in 1853, was a considerably nar-
rower law. Act to Prevent Frauds on the Treasury of the United States, ch. 81, 10 Stat. 170
(1853), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 205 (Supp. V 1993); see NEW YORK BAR STUDY, supra
note 2, at 36-39.
23. NEW YORK BAR STUDY, supra note 2, at 73-78.
24. Id. at 72-94.
25. Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
72 Stat. part 2, B12 (1958). On July 3, 1980, Congress reenacted the Code and required
each agency to display copies of the Code of Ethics for Government Service in its build-
ings. See The Act of July 3, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-303, 94 Stat. 855, 855 (1980).
26. See generally BAYLESS MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW (1964)
(providing a systematic comparison of the old law and the 1962 amendments). Manning
served as a member of the President's Advisory Panel on Ethics and Conflicts of Interest
in Government in 1961. Id. at vii.
27. Roswell B. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1114 (1963).
28. Special Message to the Congress on Conflict-of-Interest Legislation and on
Problems of Ethics in Government, PUB. PAPERS 326 (Apr. 27, 1961) [hereinafter Ken-
nedy Special Message].
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
locus was the private sector.29 In the view of Roswell Perkins, a scholar
of the new law, the government's growing dependence on the scientific
and technological expertise of transient experts multiplied the number
and subtlety of conflicting economic interests.3 °
While President Kennedy emphasized the need to deal in a balanced
manner with the presence of outside experts, he also wanted to assure the
public that government employees at all levels maintained the highest
ethical standards.31 His transmittal message to Congress included a state-
ment of the ethical principles by which all federal employees must be
bound.32 Future executive orders and ethics regulations reflected many
of these formulations.
President Kennedy's highest priority for ethics regulations in the per-
manent bureaucracy was the layer of political appointees at the top of the
pyramid. To encourage this group to set an example for their subordi-
nates, he announced his intention to cover them separately under an ex-
ecutive order prescribing specific ethics standards. 33  White House
memoranda or agency regulations provided rules for other categories of
employees.
In 1965, a major change occurred in the role of the executive branch
agencies. On May 8, 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order
11,222 which required agencies to administer ethics programs under the
active leadership of the Civil Service Commission for the first time.34 The
Order directed the Commission to issue regulations and other appropri-
29. President Kennedy stressed the need to attract temporary experts and consultants
while maintaining the government's high ethical standards. Id. at 327. The new law estab-
lished a category of special government employees who were subject to lesser restrictions
than regular employees. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203, 205, 209 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. Perkins, supra note 27, at 1114-15. Roswell Perkins chaired the Committee of the
Bar Association of the City of New York that authored CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THE
FEDERAL SERVICE. See supra note 2.
31. See Kennedy Special Message, supra note 28, at 326.
32. Id.
33. On May 5, 1961, President Kennedy issued an executive order to carry out this
commitment. Exec. Order No. 10,939, 3 C.F.R. 469 (1959-1963). The Order applied to the
heads and assistant heads of departments and agencies, full-time members of boards and
commissions appointed by the President, and members of the White House staff. Id.
President Kennedy issued a memorandum on February 9, 1962 to the heads of executive
departments and agencies entitled "Preventing Conflicts of Interest on the Part of Advi-
sors and Consultants to the Government," 3 C.F.R. 818 (1959-1963), and on May 2, 1963,
after the new conflict-of-interest laws became effective, he issued a second memorandum
to department and agency heads entitled "Preventing Conflicts of Interest on the Part of
Special Government Employees," 3 C.F.R. 834 (1959-1963). On July 20, 1961, President
Kennedy issued a memorandum entitled "Standards of Conduct for Civilian Employees."
See Exec. Order No. 11,222, § 703(d), 3 C.F.R. 311 (1964-1965).
34. See Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-65).
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ate guidance to the agencies and to implement the new financial report-
ing requirements. 35
Agencies were to promulgate regulations covering their own employ-
ees. Although the Commission permitted some variation, it required
these regulations to conform generally to its model ethics standards.36
The Commission also obliged agencies to establish employee ethics coun-
seling programs. 37 The government-wide ethics and conduct program,
which Executive Order 11,222 established, remained largely unchanged
until 1978.
By 1978, a sea change had occurred in the public attitude toward its
government. There were many possible authors of this change: Water-
gate and its profoundly disturbing impact on the public viscera; a newly
energized press with a less than cheerful view of the nation's governing
officials; a divisive war in southeast Asia which alienated many citizens
from their government; the accumulated frustrations of the cold war and
the inability of democratic government to shield its citizens from the un-
certainties of an unsettled world.38
On October 26, 1978, President Carter signed the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act into law. It is not mere coincidence that within the two-week
period immediately preceding President Carter's signature, two other im-
portant statutes also became law, the Inspector General Act 39 and the
Civil Service Reform Act.nt Taken together, these three laws suggested a
strong public perception that something in government had gone desper-
ately awry and that the existing mechanisms could not repair the
problem.
35. While the Order applied ethics standards to all employees, it retained a strong
emphasis on officials who were only loosely attached to the federal workforce. Id. at 307.
Part II dealt exclusively with those temporary employees who were an important focus of
the 1962 statute, and mandated financial disclosure for these officials. Id. Part IV included
financial disclosure requirements for certain presidential appointees. Id. at 308. The order
directed the Civil Service Commission to issue general financial disclosure regulations. id.
at 309.
36. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,529 (1965). The final version of these rules was substantially simi-
lar. 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.101 to .412 (1991).
37. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 311 (1964-65).
38. See SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 4-12 (1991) (exploring how Watergate and Vietnam changed the way the press
dealt with political matters); see also LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: How ATTACK
JOURNALISM HAS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 61-64 (1991) (explaining how
Watergate helped to shape the modern press).
39. Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
40. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
1994]
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Congress intended the Civil Service Reform Act as a total overhaul of
the system. 41 Among its many changes were mechanisms to ensure that
officials objectively measured the performance of employees so that they
could weed out or otherwise appropriately deal with incompetents.42 The
Act established an Office of Special Counsel to investigate and enforce
the newly created ban on specified prohibited personnel practices.43
Whistleblowers who identified the abuses in the system also were offered
protections under the Act. 4
The Inspector General Act established independent investigators
charged with discovering and reporting on waste, fraud, abuse, and em-
ployee misconduct. 45 Their independence prevented agency interference
with their activities.46 Each Inspector General headed an office appropri-
ately staffed with investigators and auditors.47
The Ethics in Government Act had four principal provisions. It revised
the conflict-of-interest laws applicable to former government employees,
and particularly to those who had served at senior levels.48 It initiated a
new program of public financial disclosure for a large number of employ-
ees.49 It also established an independent counsel 50 mechanism to deal
with misconduct at the highest levels of government. 51 Lastly, it created
an Office of Government Ethics (OGE) as an administrative entity within
the Office of Personnel Management.52
Though intended as a response to the dramatically altered public per-
ception of government, the Act did not fundamentally alter the substance
of ethics rules for current government employees. In his signing message,
41. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, S.
Rep. No. 2640, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2725.
42. Id. at 2724.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. Id.
47. Id. app. § 2-3.
48. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 501, 92 Stat. 1824, 1864, amend-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 207, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
49. 5 U.S.C. app. §8 101-11 (1988 &. Supp. V 1993).
50. The 1978 Act referred to these officials as "special prosecutor[s]." Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
591 (1978). Congress later changed the title to "independent counsel." Ethics in Govern-
ment Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2(c)(1), 96 Stat. 2039, 2039 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 591 to 598 (1988)).
51. Ethics in Government Act § 601.
52. Id. §§ 401-02.
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President Carter expressed the belief that this new law would help restore
public confidence in the integrity of government.53
The Ethics in Government Act did produce a more formal structure,
both at the agency level and government-wide. 54 The law and its imple-
menting regulations resulted in the designation of agency ethics officials
responsible for reviewing financial disclosure forms." New agency re-
sponsibilities implied an increase in resources available to the ethics pro-
gram and a more ordered administrative process to handle ethics issues.
The law fostered a centralization of ethics functions. The creation of
the Office of Government Ethics was one of the most significant achieve-
ments of the Ethics in Government Act.5 6 The OGE assumed responsi-
bility for stewardship over the ethics program. Its creation, however, did
not diminish the role of the agencies. 57 Each agency retained its separate
ethics code and the primary responsibility for interpreting and adminis-
tering its provisions.58 The Ethics in Government Act directed OGE to
review the financial disclosure forms of certain higher level agency offi-
cials.59 It also assigned the OGE new oversight responsibilities. 6 As the
OGE became fully operational, it was inevitable that it would play a
larger role in the management of the government's ethics program. The
OGE established an auditing capacity and required agencies to provide
specific information about their activities. 61
The Ethics in Government Act also required the OGE to establish an
advisory service and to publish its opinions. 62 The OGE had perhaps its
greatest impact in its performance of this function. For the first time,
authoritative advice on a full range of ethics questions was available to
current and former government employees, agency ethics officials, and
53. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Remarks on Signing S. 555 into Law, 11 PuB.
PAPERS 1855 (Oct. 26, 1978).
54. See Ethics in Gov't Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 101-505 (Supp. V 1993).
55. Id. app. § 106 (listing procedures for agency ethics officials to follow in reviewing
financial disclosure forms).
56. The OGE was organized as a part of the new Office of Personnel Management
which the Civil Service Reform Act had created. Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 201, 92 Stat. 1111,
1118-21 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The Congress later recon-
stituted the Office of Government Ethics as a separate and independent agency. Act of
Nov. 3, 1988, Pub. L. 100-598, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 3031, 3031 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
app. § 401(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
57. For a description of OGE's original functions, see § 402 of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1862 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
app. § 402 (Supp. V 1993)).
58. See Ethics in Government Act § 402.
59. Id. § 203(a).
60. See id. § 402 (listing the OGE's responsibilities).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 402 b(8).
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the public.63 To carry out this responsibility, the OGE signed an agree-
ment with the Department of Justice that gave it limited authority to in-
terpret the conflict-of-interest laws.'
Since its creation, the OGE has fostered an open process encouraging
all interested parties to seek its advice and assistance. Through its publi-
cation of formal opinions, it has developed a "common law" of ethics,
adding healthy mounds of flesh to the sparse skeletal structure of the old
model rules.
The most recent cycle of ethics rule changes appears to be linked
closely to a wide range of misconduct allegation's during the 1980s.65
Some of the new rules seem to address particular episodes of miscon-
duct.6 6 A more generic public concern over the ethical climate of the
government may have inspired other rules, including the new govern-
ment-wide ethics rules.
The new government-wide ethics code, established February 3, 1993,
developed out of the recommendations of the President's Commission on
Federal Ethics Law Reform.67 President Bush established the Commis-
sion on January 25, 1989, shortly after his inauguration. 68 The Commis-
sion was to "review Federal ethics laws, Executive orders, and policies
and [to] make recommendations to the President for legislative, adminis-
trative, and other reforms needed to ensure full public confidence in the
integrity of all Federal public officials and employees. "69
63. Id.
64. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 284.
65. Allegations against high administration officials often resulted in the widely publi-
cized appointment of independent counsels under the Ethics in Government Act. GAR-
MENT, supra note 38, at 83-108.
66. See Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, 102 Stat. 4631 (codified in
scattered provisions of 10, 18, 28, 31, and 41 U.S.C.) (making procurement fraud against
the federal government a separate crime); Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
Amendments of 1988, § 27, Pub. L. No. 100-679, 102 Stat. 4055, 4063 (codified as amended
in 41 U.S.C. § 423 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (prohibiting certain conduct of contractors and
procurement officials). Congress passed these acts in the wake of a massive Defense De-
partment procurement scandal known as Operation Ill-Wind. See generally Michael S. Mc-
Garry, Winning the War on Procurement Fraud: Victory at What Price?, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS 249, 276-78 (1993) (detailing the Department of Justice's investigation code
named Ill-Wind). Senator John Warner called this procurement scandal, " 'the most seri-
ous case' ever of improper conduct by Pentagon officials and military contractors." 44
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 449 (1988).
67. To SERVE WITH HONOR: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FED. ETHICS
LAW REFORM (1989) [hereinafter ETHICS COMM'N REPORT].
68. See Exec. Order No. 12,668, 3 C.F.R. 210 (1989).
69. Id. at 211. Malcolm Wilkey chaired the Commission. Members included Griffin
Bell (Vice-Chair), Jan Witold Baran, Judith Hippler Bello, Lloyd N. Cutler, Fred Fisher
Fielding, Harrison H. Schmitt, and R James Woolsey. ETHICS COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 67, at ii.
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The Commission issued its broad report in March, 1989.7o By looking
at the patchwork of ethics regulation that had developed over the previ-
ous decades,7" the Commission concluded that, "the Office of Govern-
ment Ethics should have primary responsibility for the development and
interpretation of standardized ethics rules within the executive branch."72
On April 12, 1989, President Bush issued Executive Order 12,674,
"Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employ-
ees."7 3 This Order set forth the general ethics principles that apply to all
federal employees. The order required the OGE to issue a single set of
executive branch standards in consultation with the Attorney General
and the Office of Personnel Management.74 Separate agency ethics codes
were to be abolished.75
On July 23, 1991, the OGE published its proposed rules.76 It issued
final regulations on August 7, 1992, and they became effective on Febru-
ary 3, 1993. 77
III. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW ETHICS CODE
These regulations and the Executive orders from which they arose re-
spond to the public's palpable anxiety about the ethics of its governing
officials. 78 The regulations attempt to achieve uniformity and coherence,
as the Commission recommended, and to realize the Executive order's
goal of creating regulations that are comprehensive, clear, objective, rea-
sonable, and enforceable.79
The new rules have altered the shape of the government's ethics pro-
gram dramatically. They shift the balance toward a more centralized pro-
70. See ETmics COMM'N REPORT, supra note 67, at 1.
71. Id. at 93.
72. Id.
73. Exec. Order No. 12,674, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1990). Executive Order 12,731 of October
17, 1990 later revised Executive Order 12,674. Exec. Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306
(1991).
74. Exec. Order No. 12,674, § 201(a), 3 C.F.R. 216 (1989).
75. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635,105 (1994). The new code permits agencies to supplement
these government-wide rules through the issuance regulations deemed necessary in light of
the agency's programs and operations. Id. Agencies must submit their regulations to the
OGE for concurrence and joint issuance. Id.
76. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 56 Fed.
Reg. 33,778 (1991) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635) (proposed July 23, 1991)).
77. 57 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (1992).
78. See 5 C.F.R. § 735.101 (1991) (stating that one purpose of the regulation is to
maintain the confidence of citizens in their government); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101
(1994) (listing numerous principals and responsibilities to guide federal employees in their
daily work).
79. See Exec. Order No. 12,674, § 201(a), 3 C.F.R. 215 (1990).
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gram control.8° They mandate an increasingly formal decision-making
process within each agency. Most conspicuously, when compared to the
old model ethics rules, they represent a striking increase in size and
complexity.81
While these new rules look very different, they do not alter fundamen-
tally the ethical principles of Executive Order 11222 and its implementing
rules.82 One must therefore ask what underlying purpose the new rules
are intended to serve, why they are so long and detailed, and whether
these changes will contribute to a more ethical environment or whether
they will prove to be ineffective and counterproductive.
A. Attempting to Eliminate the Arbitrariness and Generalities of the
Old Ethics Code
In part, the complexity of the new code reflects the growing size and
impact of the federal establishment and the proliferation of special inter-
ests that have created a more complicated economic and legal world.83 In
80. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (1994).
81. The new ethics regulations occupy slightly less than 46 pages in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.101 to .902 (1994). By contrast, the substantive ethics
standards of the old model rules occupied slightly more than four pages in the 1991 edition
of the Code of Federal Regulations. 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201 to 735.306 (1991). For compari-
son purposes, we exclude those provisions of the old rules dealing with confidential finan-
cial disclosure. The new government-wide regulations do not include financial disclosure
provisions. They are set forth in separate regulations. 5 C.F.R. § 2634.101 to .1004 and
appendices A and B (1994).
82. The general ethics standards in the new code, set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, have
their counterparts in the old model rules. Included here is a comparative reference be-
tween the new provisions and their predecessors:
New Rules Old Rules New Rules Old Rules
101(b) 201 (a) 101 (b) (7) 201a(a)
101(b)(1) 201a(a), 302, 304 101(b)(8) 201a(b),(d)
101(b)(2) 204(a)(1), 201a(d) 101(b)(9) 205
101(b)(3) 204(a)(2), 206, 101(b)(10) 203(a)
203(c), 303
101(b)(4) 202 101(b)(11) No prov.
101(b)(5) 201a(c) 101(b)(12) 207
101(b)(6) 201a(e) 101(b)(13) 201a(b), (d),(f)
101(b)(14) 201a
In using this comparison, this article does not intend to suggest that the ethical mandates of
the old and new rules are identical. Clearly, the new rules make a number of specific
changes. See infra notes 101-219 (comparing the old and new gift rules). Arguably, each
variation reflects a different ethical balance. Nevertheless, these shifts appear principally
to reflect semantic differences or prudential and pragmatic choices. For simplicity's sake,
this article compares provisions of the new code to the model rules rather than the individ-
ual agency ethics rules. See, e.g., supra note 36.
83. Morgan, supra note 11, at 490-91. Similar reasons were ascribed to the enactment
of the 1962 conflict-of-interest statute. Perkins, supra note 27, at 1114.
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part, the rules reflect a quantum increase in fiscal and intellectual re-
sources dedicated to the ethics program over the past several decades and
a growing sophistication in dealing with ethics issues.
Articulation of the many subtle judgments reflected in this new code
would not have been possible without the institutionalization of the ethics
function beginning in the 1960s. Much has changed since the late 1950s
when agency ethics regulation was a tentative and uncertain business,
with virtually no government-wide coordination.' In the 1970s, the Eth-
ics in Government Act brought about the creation of an ethics "commu-
nity," consisting of the OGE and a cadre of agency ethics officials
throughout the executive branch.85 These changes ensured that the
march toward increasingly complex and sophisticated ethics rules would
be inexorable.
In large part, the new approach represents a basic change in drafting
strategy. The drafters strived to abandon a code which had been based
on sweeping statements of ethical principle. They attempted to craft a
code that articulates its subtle judgments clearly, comprehensively, and
objectively.86
In its day, the broad generalities of the old model rules significantly
advanced the goal of comprehensive and effective ethics regulation. The
old rules provided government-wide guidance on daily conduct to fill the
gaps in a highly focused and porous criminal code. The old code's ethical
principles had the virtue of appearing to be self-evident, and for that very
reason, a wide range of readers could understand their purposes.
Today, however, the uncertainties of the old rules are easily uncov-
ered.87 The generality of the language was both the old code's major
strength and its principal weakness.
84. See NEW YORK BAR STUDY, supra note 2 at 72-94.
85. In its Third Biennial Report to Congress in March, 1994, the OGE reported that it
had five major subdivisions: an Office of the Director, Office of General Counsel and
Legal Policy, Office of Education, Office of Program Assistance and Review, and an Office
of Administration. UNITED STATES OFF. OF GOV'T ETHICS, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, (1994). The agency reports eighty-five full time equivalent positions in fiscal
year 1993, of which 20 are located in the Office of General Counsel and Legal Policy. Id.
at 31. Executive agency staff working in the ethics program had expanded from just over
6,000 in 1989 to more than 8,500 in 1991. UNITED STATES OFF. OF GOV'T ETHICS, SECOND
BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 44 (1992). The vast majority of these employees worked
in the program only on a part-time basis. Id.
86. See Exec. Order 12,674, 3 C.F.R. 216 (1990) (establishing as OGE goals the pro-
mulgation of "regulations that establish a single, comprehensive, and clear set of executive-
branch standards of conduct that shall be objective, reasonable, and enforceable.")
87. One notable example illustrates the breadth of the old code's provisions:
An employee shall avoid any action, whether or not specifically prohibited by this
subpart, which might result in, or create the appearance of:
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A critic properly might argue that the problem with self-evident princi-
ples is that they can self-evidently mean different things to different peo-
ple. One consequence of multiple interpretations is a perception that the
rules are unevenly and unfairly applied. There is no other charge that the
guardians of ethics regulation must take more seriously.
The OGE's answer to the serious difficulties of the old regulations is a
new code which is more than ten times longer and considerably more
complex. The new rules seek to liberate federal employees from the tyr-
anny of self-evident principles by explicitly defining the boundaries of
impermissible behavior. Employees no longer will be subjected to whim-
sically diverging interpretations of the same inscrutable generalities.
Those seeking objective guidance will not be required to locate and parse
the enigmatic, and at times paradoxical, musings of past ethics officials.
The new rules give unclear terms specific meanings and establish proce-
dures to find answers to unsettled questions. In one bold stroke, the au-
thors transformed ethics law from a "common law" jurisdiction to a
"code" jurisdiction.
The drafters, at least, intended these effects as blessings of the new
ethics code, but the choice of a long and complex code to achieve clarity
and objectivity is a high risk enterprise. It threatens to place the code
potentially out of reach for millions of federal employees, thereby under-
mining the code's fundamental purpose.8"
B. Potential Problems With the New, Detailed Ethics Code
The new code, which is a forty-five page legal document, will prove to
be a forbidding presence for the many millions of Federal employees
whom it regulates. While the OGE requires that agencies give each em-
(a) Using public office for private gain;
(b) Giving preferential treatment to any person;
(c) Impeding Government efficiency or economy;
(d) Losing complete independence or impartiality;
(e) Making a Government decision outside official channels; or
(f) Affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
Government.
5 C.F.R. § 735.201a (1991)
88. Legal scholars have noted the importance of ensuring that the drafters of legal
language are, "attentive to the probable effect[s] of [their] choice of words upon the rule's
intended audience." Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 67 (1983); see also, REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
DRAFTING 18-35 (1965).
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ployee time to read the new rules,89 no legal mechanism has been devised
to ensure that readers understand or remember what they read.90
Apart from length, specific rules often require the use of drafting tech-
niques that present further barriers to understanding. Precise (and occa-
sionally exotic) legal definitions, cross references, and incorporations by
reference are all important devices commonly used to manage large bod-
ies of complex materials. While these tools often are helpful in drafting
codes, they do not produce a "user friendly" product and they sometimes
befuddle even the experts.9 '
Moreover, the notion that detailed specifics will greatly reduce the
need for administrative interpretation merits a healthy dose of skepti-
cism. Massive litigation under laws such as the Internal Revenue Code
suggests that the goal of "one-stop shopping" for legal answers is likely to
remain elusive.
While it is difficult to write a detailed code that also is understandable,
careful drafting can improve its clarity. A complex code must achieve a
high measure of internal coherence. Specific provisions should be consis-
tent with each other and with the code's general principles. When a code
is conceptually coherent, even those unfamiliar with its exact language
may be able to make reasonable guesses. If they cannot remember the
words, it would be nice if they at least could hum the tune.
To achieve coherence and consistency in a complex code, the drafters
must successfully impose order on a vast'army of unruly details. Their
89. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.703(a)(4) (1994).
90. Id. § 2638.704(a). The OGE requires that agencies give certain employees at least
one hour of ethics training per year. Id. The OGE also has issued a 35-page handbook
describing the new rules which agencies may make available to their employees. See
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF GOV'T ETHICS, Do IT RIGHT: AN ETHICS HANDBOOK FOR
EXECUTIVE BRANCH EMPLOYEES (August 1993). The handbook provides almost four
pages describing the restrictions on gifts from sources outside the government. See id. at
10-13. This brief summary serves as a useful overview of the regulations, but the OGE
clearly does not intend for it to provide guidance on the subtle interpretive questions that
are likely to arise as a result of the code's complex language.
91. See DICKERSON, supra note 88, at 98-111 (discussing the perils and allures of
Humpty Dumptyisms: the use of arbitrary definitions in legal drafting). Dickerson refers
to Humpty Dumpty, the semanticist and former egg, celebrated in Lewis Carroll's Through
the Looking Glass. Dumpty is famous for his remark, "When I use a word, it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED
ALICE, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 269
(1960).
Dickerson believes that while arbitrary and exotic legal definitions often are convenient,
users err in assuming that because language principally is conventional, they can give
words whatever meanings they wish. See DICKERSON, supra note 88, at 98-111. Users
often fail to account for the strong psychological habits and connections which words
evoke. Id. Consequently, even those who use unconventional definitions may find it im-
possible to use them consistently. Id.
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task becomes more difficult when the drafters must modify their concep-
tual framework to adapt to specific incongruous laws and orders. The
result may be a code that embodies conflicting purposes and becomes
even more complicated because of efforts to deal with the conflicts.
The most serious threat to the internal coherence of a detailed code
arises out of the special character of ethics codes. Detailed codes draw
fine lines that can yield arbitrary results. When it comes to ethics regula-
tion, it is difficult to accept an arbitrary provision which appears to allow
an unethical official escape on a technicality. The public demands that
the drafters produce an ethics code with specific rules that are always
congruent with the commonly prevailing standards of what seems ethical.
The difficulty is that even the most skilled drafters are unable to draft
an objective code that meets these requirements. Drafters can never
foresee all possible contingencies. The need to address these contingen-
cies is largely responsible for the ubiquity in ethics codes of the "gotcha
catchall."92 The gotcha catchall comes in many forms, but whatever its
guise, it thoroughly undermines any certainty that the code's specific
rules create. It allows those charged with interpreting the rules to import
into their seemingly objective language whatever value judgements they
deem necessary to see that justice is done.93
Gotcha catchalls are found in all ethics codes. When they appear in
detailed codes, such as the new rules, however, they are particularly mis-
leading. Complex codes entice their lay readers into ignoring the effects
of catchalls. To these readers it may seem incredible that the drafters
would have spelled out the specifics so fastidiously if they had intended
this apparent precision to be nullified by a few brief and formless general-
ities. This confidence is misplaced. Drafters often include catchalls pre-
cisely because they are unwilling to accept the consequences of the more
technically precise provisions. In reality, a complex code containing these
catchalls often lacks the internal coherence and comprehensibility of sim-
pler efforts, while failing to achieve the objectivity and certainty that are
the principal reasons for its existence.
Consequently, the drafters of ethics codes are likely to be plagued by
formidable drafting demons whether they choose an approach that fo-
cuses on broad and theoretical principles or one that emphasizes detailed
and objective standards. Inherently, each approach is flawed. This stra-
92. See infra notes 219-86 and accompanying text (discussing the catchalls).
93. An extreme version of a gotcha catchall withdraws permission for an activity which
the code previously authorized when it is otherwise inappropriate. Gotcha catchalls are
quite common in daily life and are especially familiar to persons who have had the need or
occasion to explore the warranties on used automobiles.
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tegic dilemma is neither new nor unique to the field of ethics regulation.
Drafters can arrive at an optimum balance of methodologies only by
shrewdly assessing both the subject matter of the regulations and the
technical sophistication of the intended audience.
The new code is an especially revealing case study of the perils and
blessings of specific drafting. It reflects years of work by skilled drafters
with decades of institutional expertise. If the new code fails to achieve its
objectives, it is not for want of a fair attempt. Because the underlying
principles of both codes are roughly similar, it is easy to measure the de-
fects of the new code against the proven limitations of its predecessor.
This article contends that the new code strays much too far in the direc-
tion of detailed regulation. To demonstrate this thesis, the following sec-
tion provides a comparison between the new code and the old regulations
which governed the receipt of gifts from outside the government.
IV. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE RECEIPT OF GiFTs
This article focuses on the rules governing Federal employees' receipt
of gifts for two principle reasons. First, the impact of the two drafting
philosophies is highlighted dramatically by an especially sharp contrast
between the terseness of the old gift regulations and the specificity of the
new code. Second, the regulations governing gifts are among the ethics
code's most important provisions. They address a fundamental and abid-
ing symbol of government gone astray. The use of public office for pri-
vate gain undermines public confidence that official action fairly reflects
the outcome of democratic processes.
The framers of the Constitution understood the hazards of benevo-
lence. They prohibited government officials from accepting "any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State" without the consent of Congress.94 Our more
recent ethics codes recognize that home-grown gifts can also seriously un-
dermine governmental processes and that gifts less grand than the con-
ferring of a dukedom can place one in another's debt.
Our ethics laws and rules devote much attention to the receipt of gifts.
We have statutes that prohibit bribery,9" illegal gratuities,96 receipt of
gifts by procurement officials, 7 and the supplementation of government
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). Unlike the gratuities statute, the bribery statute re-
quires as elements of the crime corrupt gifts or offers, and an intent to influence the offi-
cial. Id.
96. Id. § 201(c).
97. 41 U.S.C. § 423(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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salary by sources outside the government.98 Even laws which do not deal
expressly with gifts reflect a similar concern over the receipt of valuable
items from sources outside the government. Laws forbid federal employ-
ees from receiving compensation for most private representational serv-
ices before government agencies and courts.99 Moreover, statutes and
Executive orders place limits on the receipt of outside income. 100
While these and other statutory restrictions address specific abuses, it is
the task of the ethics regulations to deal with gift issues more broadly. It
is hoped that a comparison of the gift provisions in the old and new codes
will illuminate some of the strengths and deficiencies of specificity as a
drafting strategy, and particularly in the formulation of ethics codes.
A. The Old Gift Code
Although the old gift code lacked detail, its meaning was largely clear.
The ban on gift acceptance was broad, and there were very few excep-
tions. The old code prohibited gifts from improper sources, which in-
cluded persons having or seeking business with the employee's agency,
those whom the agency regulated, and those who had interests which
might be substantially affected by the performance or non-performance
of the employee's official duties. 1 '
The old code permitted gifts from these prohibited sources only if they
qualified under one of the code's few exceptions. For example, the old
code allowed employees to accept gifts which were clearly motivated by
family or personal relationships.0 2 In addition, employees might receive
food and refreshments of nominal value on infrequent occasions in the
ordinary course of an official meeting or inspection tour. 10 3 They could
accept awards for meritorious public contribution or achievement from
various charitable or civic organizations. °4 They were free to obtain
loans from financial institutions under customary terms.10 5 The code did
not require them to return unsolicited advertising or promotional materi-
als, such as pens, calendars, note pads, and other items of nominal intrin-
98. 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2636.301 to .307 (1994) (describing the outside earned income limi-
tation and affiliation restrictions applicable to certain noncareer employees).
101. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(a) (1991).
102. Id. § 735.202(b)(1).
103. Id. § 735.202(b)(2).
104. Id. § 735.203(e)(3). Oddly enough, the old code includes this provision among the
rules dealing with outside employment and other activities.
105. Id. § 735.202(b)(3).
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sic value. 116 If a gift from an improper source did not satisfy one of these
exceptions, however, the old code prohibited its receipt.
While the old gift code covered gifts to employees, it did not apply to a
broad range of gifts commonly proffered to the employee's agency.
Other rules generally barred these agency gifts. 10 7 Appropriation law,
rather than ethics regulations, largely served as the basis for the prohibi-
tion on agency gifts, including the payment of official travel expenses.
Because the law ordinarily requires an agency to pay travel expenses,t0 8
donations from private sources augment the agency's appropriation with-
out the consent of the Congress. 109
Congress gave some agencies express permission to augment their ap-
propriations.' These gift-acceptance statutes allowed private parties to
106. Id. § 735.202(b)(4).
107. Until recently, it usually was illegal for private persons to defray the costs of a
government employee's travel. See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text. The rules
required government employees to turn down offers of transportation, hotel accommoda-
tions, or subsistence expenses in connection with official speeches or other meetings which
they attended in an official capacity.
108. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5702 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 5702 requires that agen-
cies pay most federal employees expenses in connection with official travel. Section 5703
authorizes, but does not require, agencies to pay these expenses for employees serving
intermittently in government service as experts or consultants and paid on a daily when-
actually-employed basis, or those serving without pay or at one dollar per year. 5 U.S.C.
§ 5703 (1988). Many, though not all, of these experts and consultants will qualify as "spe-
cial government employees" under 18 U.S.C. § 202 because of their limited attachment to
the federal workforce. 18 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). Section 209 does not apply to special
government employees or employees serving without compensation. 18 U.S.C. § 209(c)
(1988).
109. The anti-augmentation principle is not provided explicitly by statute, but is derived
from three separate statutory components. See 2 OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, UNITED
STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FED. APPROPRIATIONS LAW, 6-103 (2d
ed. 1992) [hereinafter 2 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL].
First, 31 U.S.C. § 3302 provides that the gross amount of any moneys that an agency
receives must be deposited promptly in the Treasury without any abatement, deduction, or
charges. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (1988). The GAO interprets this requirement to mean the Gen-
eral Fund of the Treasury rather than the agency's appropriation. 2 OFFICE OF THE GEN-
ERAL COUNSEL, supra, at 6-106.
The second provision requires that appropriated funds be used only for their intended
purposes. 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988). "Early decisions often based the augmentation prohi-
bition" on §§ 1301 and 1302. 2 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra, at 6-103.
In the GAO's view, the third statutory basis for the anti-augmentation rule is the con-
flict-of-interest statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1988). OFF. OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra, at 6-
103. Section 209 forbids any outside source from paying any salary or supplementation of
salary to a federal official. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. The GAO believes
that this provision prohib its an outside source from paying the travel expenses of govern-
ment employees on agency business. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the use of section 209 to support the rule against augmentation of appropriations).
110. See 46 Comp. Gen. 689 (1967). For examples of statutory gift-acceptance author-
ity, see 22 U.S.C. § 2509(a) (1988) (authorizing the President to accept gifts for the Peace
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subsidize official trips, as long as the agency and the private concerns fol-
lowed proper procedures.11' The regulations required the donor to con-
tribute any funds directly to the agency." 2 They also directed the agency
to reimburse the employee for the expenses of the trip in accordance with
normal government travel procedures. The employee received no addi-
tional payment because of the gift.
113
The Government Employees Training Act" 4 also allowed employees
to accept approved expenses incident to participation in training or at-
tendance at meetings. The Act only permitted contributions from donors
which were tax-exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code" 5 (charitable, educational, and religious organiza-
tions)1 16 and state, county, or municipal treasuries. 1 7 Donors were to
make gifts directly to the employee and not to the agency. 1 8 Implement-
ing regulations imposed additional conditions on the acceptance of Train-
ing Act gifts, including requirements that agencies review the conflict-of-
interest considerations. '19
The anti-augmentation principles and the old gift rules established a
system of gift regulation which was complicated, but the bottom line re-
sults of its operation were not fundamentally confusing. The rules were
very restrictive. There were few exceptions. Use of the broadest of these
exceptions, the Government Employees Training Act,' clearly required
agency approval. 2' Only employees who had agency permission or suffi-
cient authority to act on behalf of the agency could use the agency gift-
acceptance statutes.122 Thus, there was little possibility that employees
Corps) and 18 U.S.C. § 4044 (1988) (authorizing the Attorney General to accept gifts for
the Bureau of Prisons or Federal Prison industries).
111. See 46 Comp. Gen. 689 (1967). A gift-acceptance statute is, in effect, congres-
sional authority to augment an agency's appropriations. Id.
112. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(f) (1991).
113. Id.
114. 5 U.S.C. §§ 4101-19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
115. 41 U.S.C. § 4111 (1988).
116. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
117. The Training Act itself does not contain explicit permission to accept gifts from
state, county, or municipal treasuries. See 5 U.S.C. § 4111 (1988). The implementing regu-
lations included the state and local treasury exemption. See 5 C.F.R. § 410.702 (1993). The
regulations permit gifts from organizations to which the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 209 do
not apply. 5 C.F.R. § 410.702 (1994). Section 209(a) specifically exempts payments from
state or local treasuries. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
118. 55 Comp. Gen. 1293 (1976).
119. See 5 C.F.R. § 410.702 (1994) (discussing the OPM requirements concerning fed-
eral employees' acceptance of gifts from non-governmental organizations).
120. See supra notes 114-19 (discussing the Government Employees Training Act).
121. 5 C.F.R. § 410.702 (1994).
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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who were unfamiliar with these rules would try to grapple with their com-
plexities without the agency's assistance.
While the old gift rules were not devoid of interpretive issues, the un-
certainties were considerably more modest than those which the new gift
code creates. The old rules did contain some ambiguities, and there was
some variation among agencies. For example, the old rules generally out-
lawed gifts from individuals or entities which the employee's agency regu-
lated.123 If one subunit of a diverse cabinet agency regulated the
prospective donor, it was not clear whether the law prohibited all agency
employees from receiving gifts from that donor or only the employees of
the regulating subunit. Generally, the interpretations or regulations of
each agency were left to resolve this important question.
124
The old gift rules allowed employees to consume meals of nominal
value on infrequent occasions in the ordinary course of an official meet-
ing or inspection tour.125 The rules did not define the terms "nominal"
and "infrequent." Moreover, the terms lacked any obvious numerical
meaning. There was no reason to assume that the agencies would inter-
pret or define these terms consistently. 126
In addition, the OGE interpretations of the terms were not always ob-
vious from the face of the regulations. In October, 1987, OGE held that
the exception for nominal value lunches did not apply to "one-on-one
business lunches" at restaurants nor to receptions given by interest
groups, even if the parties discussed business. 127 The OGE also has had
to clarify by its interpretations when commercial discounts to employees
constitute prohibited gifts. 12 8 Nevertheless, ambiguities of this magnitude
were not likely to undermine an employee's understanding of the old
rules.
Even uncertainties of far greater potential importance created few
practical problems. One of these uncertainties involved the relationship
between the gift rules and 18 U.S.C. § 209, a criminal provision which
123. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(a)(2) (1991).
124. The new gift code addresses this matter directly by allowing cabinet departments,
with OGE approval, to divide themselves into discrete units for the purposes of defining
"prohibited source[s]." 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(a) (1994).
125. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(b)(2) (1991).
126. The successor provisions in the new regulations only partially eliminate these am-
biguities. See infra notes 153-219 (discussing confusing issues in the new gift code).
127. Acceptance of Food and Refreshments by Executive Branch Employees, Off.
Gov't Ethics Op. 87 x 13 (Oct. 23, 1987). The new regulations attempt to address these
issues definitively. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.204(a),(g) (1994).
128. Acceptance of Commercial Discounts, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 85 x 13 (Sept. 17,
1985); Letter to an Agency Ethics Official dated July 22, 1986, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 86 x 7
(June 22, 1986). The new regulations also specify when employees may accept such dis-
counts. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.203(b)(4), .204(c) (1994).
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prohibits most government employees from receiving any salary or sup-
plementation of their government salaries from outside sources. 129 Com-
plying with the ethics regulations, of course, did not relieve employees of
their responsibilities under the criminal code. Because the old ethics
code and the ban on agency gifts were so strict, there was little danger
that an employee who followed the rules would violate section 209.
In some cases, however, it was possible to interpret the language of the
gift rules as conflicting with section 209. The old gift rules explicitly al-
lowed employees to accept certain awards for outstanding public ser-
vice.' 30 Although these awards plausibly could be construed as
supplementations of salary in violation of section 209, the Justice Depart-
ment and the OGE consistently have viewed such awards as
permissible.'
The model rule allowing employees to accept food and refreshment of
nominal value in connection with official meetings also arguably clashed
with section 209.132 However, there has been no evident prosecutorial
enthusiasm to indict those employees who had accepted nominal gifts in
compliance with agency ethics regulations under section 209.
Another potentially troubling interpretive issue under the old model
rules involved its most notable gotcha catchall. In effect, the old rules
warned employees that they were in violation of the rules by appearing to
be unethical, even if there were no specific provisions prohibiting their
behavior.'3 3 Again, the highly proscriptive nature of the gift rules made
it unlikely that employees who obeyed the code's more particular man-
dates would violate this catchall provision.
In summary, the uncertainties of the old model gift rules were not suffi-
cient to undermine their clarity. The old code succeeded despite an ab-
sence of detail, not because of it. Had the old model gift rules been more
permissive, as are the new regulations, their lack of specificity could have
been considerably more confusing. Moreover, their gotcha catchalls
would have been more significant. The old code was comprehensible
largely because it proclaimed loudly, albeit without much detail, the sim-
plest word in the lexicon of an ethics official: "No!"
129. 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1988).
130. 5 C.F.R. § 735.203(e)(3) (1991).
131. Letter to a DAEO dated July 26, 1983, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x 11 (July 26,
1983).
132. Summary of Acceptance and Disclosure of Travel Expenses and Related Gifts,
Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 84 x 5 (May 1, 1984) (discussing the ability of employees to be reim-
bursed directly or to accept payment offers of travel expenses); Letter to a DAEO dated
Feb. 4, 1983, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x 3 (same).
133. See supra note 87 for the text of this provision.
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B. The New Gift Code
The new rules issued by the OGE, on the other hand, attempt to
achieve a more subtle and difficult task. The OGE endeavors to intro-
duce flexibility by permitting reasonable gifts which conform to the
broader principles of the old code. In introducing this new flexibility, the
OGE avoids the broadly stated exceptions to the gift-acceptance ban
under the old rules. Instead, it describes the permissible gifts in rich de-
tail. The specificity of the new rules reflects an effort to craft the new
exceptions cautiously and to avoid the subjectivity that can produce many
different interpretations of the same language. These rational efforts to
fine tune the gift-acceptance ban draw upon extensive experience with
the rigidities of the old system.
As this article explains, however, the new code's detail causes complex-
ity which overloads all systems. It strains the capacity of the regulated
public to understand the code's language and the ability of the drafters to
manage an increasingly ungovernable body of minutia consistently and
coherently. The "last straw" lands on the back of the beleaguered camel
when newly resurgent gotcha catchalls seriously undermine the code's ef-
forts to achieve objectivity.
1. Distinguishing Between Personal and Agency Gifts
The new code's failures to achieve a consistent definition of "gift" and
to distinguish coherently between personal and agency gifts foreshadow
its critical problem in producing clarity. In the old, simpler, and highly
proscriptive gift code, definitions were not very important. Indeed the
model rules lacked a definition of the term gift. In the new, highly com-
plex code, definitions become crucial.
Insistence on definitional purity is not the product of an ill-tempered
fussiness. Clarity and consistency of regulatory definitions, apart from
their other virtues, also are mnemonic devices. By emphasizing clear and
consistent definitions, the drafters can transform the process of learning a
forty-page code into rational analysis, rather than an exercise in sheer
memorization. Rule memorization is an exercise that few of the millions
of employees subject to the ethics codes are likely to undertake
successfully.
While subpart B of the new government-wide ethics code covers gifts
to the employee, it does not cover gifts to the employee's agency. The
GSA has set forth rules which cover gifts to the employee's agency.1
34
134. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.201 (1994). Gift is defined to include anything of monetary
value, with certain specified exclusions. For example, the definition excludes loans on pub-
licly available terms; discounts and other favorable rates available to the public or all gov-
1994]
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The Ethics Reform Act authorized the GSA to issue rules greatly ex-
panding the authority of agencies to accept gifts. 135 As previously noted,
some agencies already had their own special statutory gift-acceptance au-
thority.' 36 The existence of a new, complex GSA agency gift code adds
considerably to the difficulty in understanding the OGE ethics rules, be-
cause the GSA and OGE regulations need to be read in conjunction with
one another.
The new ethics rules generally bar personal "gifts" to an employee
from "prohibited sources ' , 137 or because of an employee's official posi-
tion.' 38 This general proscriptive standard is similar to that of the old
model rules.' 39 Unlike the model rules, the new OGE regulations pro-
vide many detailed exceptions. However, these excepted gifts also must
meet additional limitations set forth in the regulations. 4 '
In the new gift code, it is essential that employees understand the dis-
tinction between personal and agency gifts. In light of the special oppro-
brium that attaches to ethical infractions, employees need to understand
whether a potential gift raises an ethics question or reflects a matter of
proper agency procedures. Clear distinctions can help employees deter-
mine where to look for answers. Moreover, in a complex body of rules,
such as the new gift code, a grasp of basic definitions is critical to under-
standing all of the code's detailed mandates. The confusion between per-
sonal and agency gifts is one of subpart B's major flaws.
ernment employees generally; prizes in contests open to the public or a broadly defined
class and unrelated to the employee's duties; items for which the employee pays market
value; items that the government purchases; and items that the agency accepts as agency
gifts. See id. §§ 2635.201,.203(b) (1994).
135. 31 U.S.C. § 1353 (Supp. V 1993).
136. Where the GSA rules cover a gift to an agency, they are, with limited exceptions,
the only authority under which the agency may accept the gift. Id. § 1353(a).
137. A prohibited source refers to any person who:
(1) Is seeking official action by the employee's agency;
(2) Does business or seeks to do business with the employee's agency;
(3) Conducts activities regulated by the employee's agency;
(4) Has interests that may be substantially affected by performance or nonper-
formance of the employee's official duties; or
(5) Is an organization a majority of whose members are described in paragraphs
(d) (1) through (4) of this section.
5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d) (1994)
138. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(a)(2) (1994).
139. Compare 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204 (1994) (listing exceptions to the gift-acceptance ban
of the new regulations) with 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(b) (1991) (noting exceptions to the old gift-
acceptance ban).
140. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(c) (1994).
[Vol. 44:141
Judging Gift Rules by Their Wrappings
a. Previous Failures to Distinguish Between Personal and Agency
Gifts
The absence of a clear distinction between personal and agency gifts
long predates the creation of the OGE gift rules. The lack of conceptual
clarity also was inherent in the old model rules that drew heavily on old
opinions by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The current complex
regulatory structure, thus, exists on a very uncertain foundation.
The confusion arose out of early efforts to base the rule against agency
gifts, in part, on an ethics-based criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 20914" and
its predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 1914.142 These provisions prohibit federal
employees from accepting any salary or salary supplementation from an
outside source for performing government work.1 43 The GAOI44 histori-
141. 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1988).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1914 (1958), repealed by Act of Oct. 23, 1962 Pub. L. No. 87-849, § 2,
76 Stat. 1119, 1126.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1988).
144. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the General Accounting Of-
fice, which is headed by the Comptroller General of the United States. Budget and Ac-
counting Act, ch. 18, § 301, 42 Stat. 20, 23 (1921). It is an "instrumentality of the United
States Government independent of the executive departments." 31 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1988).
The Comptroller General is entrusted with a variety of fiscal and accounting responsibili-
ties. See id. §§ 711-736 (providing a list of the duties and powers of the Comptroller
General).
Title 31 U.S.C. § 3529 directs the Comptroller General to issue decisions in response to
requests for advice on the propriety of various payments by responsible officials. Id.
§ 3529. The expenditure of government funds is the focus of these decisions. Id. § 3529(a).
Nevertheless, in determining whether the expenditure is valid, the GAO has found it nec-
essary to interpret a wide variety of substantive statutes.
The GAO General Counsel has taken the position that its decisions are binding on the
executive branch and the United States General Accounting Office. 2 OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 109, at 1-27.
The scope of the GAO's authority to issue binding opinions is far from clear. Even the
GAO General Counsel reports that there are some areas in which the GAO will decline to
issue a decision because it is not in a position to render authoritative determinations. Id. at
1-30 to 1-31. These areas include matters of criminal law. Id.; see also 48 Comp. Gen. 24,
27 (1968) (stating that criminal statutes are under exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Justice). Moreover, there likely will be continuing dialogue over the role of the Comp-
troller General in interpreting substantive statutes vis-a-vis the role of the agencies and
that of the Attorney General, as chief executive branch lawyer. Congress has given the
Attorney General statutory authority to render opinions. 28 U.S.C. § 512 (1988).
For a discussion of challenges to the GAO's role in contract adjudication, see Alex D.
Tomaszczuk & John E. Jensen, The Adjudicatory Arm of Congress-The GAO's Sixty-Year
Role in Deciding Government Contract Bid Protests Comes. Under Renewed Attack by the
Department of Justice, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 399 (1992).
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), raises many
serious questions about the authority of the Comptroller General to control or direct the
operations of the Executive Branch. The Bowsher Court held that in light of congressional
influence over the GAO, the GAO's exercise of authority under the Balanced Budget and
1994]
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cally has viewed the payment of government travel expenses by outside
sources as a supplementation of the employee's salary in violation of sec-
tion 209.'45
It is clear why payment of employee travel expenses is seen appropri-
ately as an augmentation of an agency's appropriations. Because the
agency legally is bound to pay these expenses, payments by private
sources increase the funds otherwise available to the agency. It is not
clear, however, why such payments must be seen as a supplementation of
the employee's salary in violation of section 209. The gift does not place
the employee in a more advantageous position.
The GAO has found it difficult to apply its broad interpretation of the
criminal statute in a consistent manner. On the one hand, it has ruled
that an employee may not accept cash reimbursements for travel ex-
penses. On the other hand, an employee may directly accept these ex-
penses in-kind where the agency has statutory gift-acceptance
authority. 1
46
In a 1956 decision, the Comptroller General offered a less than persua-
sive explanation for its distinction between cash and in-kind expenses.
47
He suggested that in the case of in-kind gifts, the close working relation-
ship between the donor and the agency substantially eliminated the evils
that Congress intended to address. 48 He therefore allowed in-kind gifts
of employee expenses to be treated as gifts to the agency.
1 49
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063
(1985) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), violated separation of powers,
which the Constitution requires. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736.
Regardless of the limits on the GAO's authority, executive branch agencies continue to
seek its opinions in part because of its acknowledged expertise, particularly in fiscal areas.
145. In 1923, the Comptroller General held that a payment to cover the salary and
expenses of a government employee was an illegal payment of salary or supplementation
of salary (under the predecessor to section 209) even if it is made directly to the agency
rather than to the employee. 2 Comp. Gen. 775 (1923).
A long line of GAO decisions supports the proposition that payment of government
travel expenses to an employee violates section 209 and its predecessor provisions. See,
e.g., 55 Comp. Gen 1293 (1976); 64 Comp. Gen. 185 (1985); see also Letter from Joseph
Campbell, Comptroller General, to Tom Murray, Chairman, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, United States House of Representatives (May 2, 1957), in 85 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2918 (1958) (examining a proposed statute regarding the training of federal employees).
146. See 36 Comp. Gen. 268 (1956).
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It is curious that the GAO saw the close ties between the agency and
the donor as authorizing in-kind gifts to agency employees. 150 Both the
old and new ethics codes treat donors with close agency ties as prohibited
sources. 151 Moreover, reliance on donor-agency ties conflicts with the
history of the statute. In 1917, Congress enacted the predecessor to sec-
tion 209 in an attempt to respond to donors who paid the salaries of dol-
lar-a-year agency employees because of their close links to a given
agency. 152
Even though the old ethics rules and their specific gift provisions did
not pay significant attention to definitional matters, they clearly are pre-
mised on these GAO opinions. Both the old rules and the GAO opinions
failed to distinguish convincingly between personal and agency gifts, and
they share the GAO's questionable interpretation of section 209. The old
code's failure to grapple successfully with its underlying conceptual ten-
sions had few practical consequences. The old rules were strict, but easy
to remember. Employees who followed them were unlikely to violate
section 209, regardless of how broadly or narrowly the law might be
interpreted.
b. The Failure of the New Gift Code to Distinguish Between
Personal and Agency Gifts
The new OGE regulations create a changed legal environment. The
rules must provide crisp distinctions between personal and agency gifts if
employees are to understand them intuitively. Moreover, it now becomes
crucial for the regulators to resolve the interpretive issues surrounding
section 209. The OGE and the GSA codes considerably broaden the au-
thority of the employee and the agency to accept gifts. Employees must
know whether this criminal statute limits in any way the broader gift-
acceptance permission which the language of the rules purports to confer.
Rather than resolving past confusions however, the OGE perpetuates
them in its new rules. The new code considers as personal or non-gifts
many items which are similar in character to those that GSA treats as
agency gifts. 153 Deeming these items to be personal gifts (or even non-
gifts) has a mixed effect. While employees who improperly accept these
items may be vulnerable to an ethics charge, the code's artificial expan-
sion of the personal gift definition paradoxically broadens an employee's
150. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia criticized the reasonableness of the Attorney General's interpretation of section 209.
Id. at 176-83.
151. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.202(a) (1991); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d) (1994).
152. NEW YORK BAR STUDY, supra note 2, at 54.
153. 31 U.S.C. § 1353 (Supp. V 1993).
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authority to accept such items. Because the code now deems these items
to be personal gifts, the OGE can authorize their acceptance under its
regulations without violating the GSA's exclusive jurisdiction over the
acceptance of covered agency gifts. 154
The OGE permits employees to accept many items as personal gifts
although the agency is the exclusive economic beneficiary. One new rule
allows gifts of food, refreshments, or entertainment in connection with
certain foreign meetings or events.' 55 Although the rule characterizes
these expenses as employee gifts, the OGE appears to recognize that the
purpose of this exception is not to validate personal benefits for the em-
ployee, but to help the agency more effectively perform its mission. 156
The OGE perceives the "foreign meeting" provision as a tool for agencies
to supplement their agency gift authority. 157
The new ethics code also includes a broad new de minimis exception
which permits unsolicited gifts with a market value of twenty dollars or
less per occasion, as long as the aggregate market value of gifts from any
one person does not exceed fifty dollars in a calendar year. 158 While this
exception does not focus specifically on agency-related gifts, it does allow
employees on official travel to accept food and subsistence expenses as
personal gifts.' 59 The agency ordinarily would be responsible for paying
these expenses under government travel regulations.
Another exception in the new gift code permits those who present
agency views at official meetings to receive as non-gifts "free attendance"
154. With certain specified exceptions, the GSA rules are the only authority permitting
an agency to accept, or authorize an employee to accept on behalf of the agency, payments
from a non-federal source in connection with the attendance of its employees, and/or ac-
companying spouses, at meetings and events which the GSA rules cover. 41 C.F.R. § 304-
1.8(a) (1994). The regulations provide an exception for personal acceptance of gifts when
consistent with the applicable standards of ethical conduct. Id. § 304-1.8(a)(4) (1994).
With the exception of the Government Employees Training Act and the Foreign Gifts and
Decorations Act, employees and agencies who accept a covered gift other than under the
GSA authority are subject to specified penalties. 31 U.S.C. § 1353(b) (Supp. V 1993).
155. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(i) (1994).
156. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed.
Reg. 35,006, 35,021 (1992).
157. In defending the adequacy of the regulation's per diem limitation, the OGE states:
"In those few cases where it is not sufficient, agencies may be able to use the authority at 31
U.S.C. 1353 to accept free attendance at meetings and similar events, or may be able to use
a separate agency gift acceptance statute." Id. (emphasis added).
158. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) (1994).
159. The OGE points out that although the GSA statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1353, is the only
authority allowing an agency to accept gifts for events that the GSA rules cover, employees
still may personally accept de minimis gifts in connection with the same functions. Id.
§ 2635.204(a), ex. 4.
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from the sponsor of the event. 160 Free attendance includes a waiver of
conference fees and the furnishing of materials, food, refreshments, and
entertainment.161 The food and refreshment items are comparable to
those that agency employees may receive under the foreign meeting
exception.162
It is evident that the OGE does not rigorously distinguish between per-
sonal and agency gifts. It treats items as personal gifts or non-gifts even
though the donations facilitate the conduct of official duties. Despite the
GSA's exclusive authority to regulate certain agency gifts, the OGE, with
the GSA's apparent approval, does not shrink from effectively asserting
concurrent jurisdiction.
Such an approach blurs the lines between personal and agency gifts.
Moreover, even the words of the OGE appear to reflect very serious legal
misgivings about the approach it has taken. The OGE has expressed
strong doubts about its own power to authorize gifts which are directly
related to an employee's performance of official duties.
163
The new code's definitions are confusing in other ways. It treats subsis-
tence expenses which agency officials receive under the "speaker" provi-
sion as non-gifts, but regards similar items they receive under the foreign
160. Id. § 2635.204(g)(1).
161. Id. § 2635.204(g)(4).
162. Compare id. § 2635.204(g)(1) (allowing free attendance at events when employees
are speakers or are on the panel) with id. § 2635.204(i) (permitting employees to accept
food and entertainment when they are on duty in a foreign area).
163. The OGE expressed its view in response to comments it received on the proposed
ethics regulations. Proposed section 2635.204(g)(2) permitted employees to receive as per-
sonal gifts food, refreshments, and entertainment incident to "widely-attended" gatherings
during off-duty hours. Several agencies had recommended that the rules be expanded to
cover on-duty receptions. 57 Fed. Reg. 35,019 (1992). The OGE declined to cover these
events because its coverage of on-duty events could result in illegal agency gifts.
In rejecting the proposal, OGE stated:
While this revision may not fully address the concerns noted, it is imposed of
necessity to ensure that the gift is made to the employee rather than to the agency
and, thus, that it does not improperly augment agency appropriations available for
payment of expenses of attendance at training, meetings or similar events. ...
It is in part the purpose of renumbered § 2635.204(g)(2) to fill a gap in statu-
tory authorities under which agencies or employees may accept gifts of free at-
tendance. Some agency gift acceptance statutes and 31 U.S.C. 1353 provide
authority for agencies, that otherwise would use their own funds for those pur-
poses, to accept gifts from non-Federal sources to enable their employees to at-
tend certain events on official time.
Standards of Ethical conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed. Reg. 35,006,
35,019 (1992) (emphasis added).
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meeting and de minimis exceptions as personal gifts."6 The OGE's ra-
tionale for its inconsistent definitions of these comparable items is not
persuasive. It argues that the subsistence expenses that an official
speaker accepts are not gifts because they are a necessary and customary
part of performing the assignment. 165 The OGE fails to explain why the
same reasoning does not apply to similar subsistence items which agency
employees receive under the foreign meeting and de minimis provisions.
It treats similar items received under these provisions as personal gifts." 6
Besides treating subsistence expenses under the speaker provision as
non-gifts, the OGE ethics regulations exclude other items from the defi-
nition of gifts. For example, these non-gifts include greeting cards 167 and
modest items of food and refreshment that are not offered as part of a
meal.168 The regulations, however, do not appear to treat these non-gift
items consistently. 169
Employees will be unable to find a coherent and intuitive set of princi-
ples to decide whether an item is a potential gift, and if so, whether the
beneficiary is the employee, the agency, both, or neither. Moreover, it is
not possible for an employee to know how the regulations will treat an
164. It is unclear where the OGE gets the authority to rule that these gifts are not
agency gifts. Under the Ethics Reform Act, the OGE's jurisdiction is limited to employee
gifts. 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (Supp. V 1993).
165. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(1) (1994).
166. Id. § 2635.204(a),(i). Arguably, free admission of a government speaker to a pri-
vate event on the day of the speech is not a gift to either the employee or the agency. The
purpose of the official's admission is to furnish a service to the sponsor of the event and not
to receive a gift. It is impossible for the employee to perform the assignment without being
admitted to the meeting. A similar rationale applies to the use of conference material in
connection with the official's preparation and participation.
On the other hand, it is possible for employees to perform the assignments without the
donors providing free meals or allowing them to retain the conference materials. Donation
of these items clearly represents the transfer of a benefit to either the employee or the
agency. While agency employees often incur subsistence expenses in connection with the
performance of assignments, the expenses generally are the responsibility of the agency
when the employee is in travel status. These expenses may be the responsibility of the
employee in other situations.
167. Id. § 2635.203(b)(2).
168. Id. § 2635.203(b)(1).
169. The regulations classified these items as non-gifts so that employees could accept
them freely without regard to the additional catchall restrictions of section 2635.202(c).
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed. Reg. 35,006,
35,013 (1992). Items which agency employees receive under the speaker provisions are
also non-gifts, but they may be subject to the catchalls.
Unlike the other non-gifts, speaker items are listed in section 2635.204, among the "ex-
ceptions" to the gift acceptance ban. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204 (1994). The introductory text of
section 2635.202(c) states that most items included in section 2635.204 are subject to the
catchalls. On the other hand, the language of most of the catchall provisions purports to
apply only to the acceptance of gifts.
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item merely by remembering whether the rules characterize it as a gift or
a non-gift. If employees have questions, they will have to find the an-
swers in the regulations themselves, a task they cannot easily accomplish.
These regulations are very difficult for a non-expert to understand.
The problem is not only the lavish use of legal techniques such as special-
ized definitions, cross references, and incorporations by reference. It is
not merely the extravagant detail that can lure an employee who has
found an apparently relevant provision into falsely believing that it is safe
to look no further. The OGE and related gift codes present the regulated
public with an array of overlapping, duplicative, and slightly varying pro-
visions that are very difficult to comprehend.
c. A Hypothetical Application of the Old and New Gift Rules
To illustrate these difficulties, consider how the rules apply to the fol-
lowing hypothetical example. An employee will participate in an official
foreign tour to gather background information useful in the development
of United States trade policy. The employee will participate in seminars
and meet individually with entrepreneurs. A university in the foreign
country offers to pay the employee's travel expenses and to provide a
very generous subsistence allowance during the one-week trip. The
agency has statutory gift-acceptance authority. For the purposes of this
hypothetical, the potential donors are prohibited sources under the ethics
rules.
Under the old ethics structure, it would have been necessary to con-
sider four separate authorities: the foreign gift statutes, the Government
Employees Training Act, the agency gift-acceptance laws, and the ethics
provisions allowing employees to accept food and refreshments of nomi-
nal value in the course of official meetings. The first three continue to be
relevant under the new gift rules. A new and even broader de minimis
provision has replaced the "nominal value" exception in the old model
rules.
The Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act 7 ' would apply in this case only
if the university were an arm of a foreign state or a conduit for foreign
government funds. This Act, which authorizes gifts from foreign govern-
ments, permits an employee to accept subsistence and travel expenses
taking place entirely outside of the United States. 7 ' It does not permit
the employee to accept payment for travel to the foreign country.
1 72
170. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (1988).
171. Id. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
172. Id.
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It is unlikely that the Government Employees Training Act 1 73 would
apply to these hypothetical facts. The Training Act authorizes acceptance
of gifts incident to participation in training and official meetings. 17  The
Act limits donors to charitable, educational, and religious organizations
exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code and state or local treasuries. 175 A foreign university is unlikely to
have obtained section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
As previously noted, the agency in the hypothetical has statutory gift-
acceptance authority which might cover some of the trip's expenses.
Before the promulgation of the new rules, agencies with broad agency
gift-acceptance statutes could accept cash contributions directly and reim-
burse the employee for travel expenses under normal government proce-
dures. The employee also could accept in-kind expenses directly.'76 If
the agency lacked its own gift acceptance authority, special circumstances
might justify other arrangements allowing an outside source to finance
the trip.177
The old provision permitting employees to accept food and refresh-
ments of nominal value might be of some help for minor expenses which
other authorities do not cover. The two new provisions allowing employ-
ees to accept modest items of food and refreshment and items of little
intrinsic value also may cover these expenses.
The new gift rules add an array of fresh authorities with complex con-
sequences. Some expenses in the hypothetical example appear to be ac-
ceptable under the OGE's new foreign meetings exception. This
exception applies where attendance at a meeting or event is part of the
employee's official duties to obtain or disseminate information, promote
the export of United States goods and services, represent the United
States, or otherwise further programs or operations of the agency or the
United States mission in the foreign area.' 78 It covers meetings which
non-United States citizens or representatives of foreign governments or
entities attend.' 79 This provision, like each of the other gift acceptance
173. 5 U.S.C. § 4101 (1988).
174. Id. § 4111(a).
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 146-49 (discussing in-kind gifts).
177. These arrangements might include the employee's assignment to an agency that
has gift-acceptance authority, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 215 (1988) (providing authority for the
Public Health Service to detail employees to other government departments), to a foreign
government, 22 U.S.C. § 2387 (1988), to an international organization, id. § 2388, or to a
requesting country, id. § 1451. In some cases, the Economy Act may warrant arrange-
ments with agencies having gift-acceptance authority. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535-36 (1988).
178. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(i)(3) (1994).
179. Id. § 2635.204(i)(2).
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rules, contains a unique description of the gifts that agency employees
may accept. It permits the employee to accept food, refreshments, and
entertainment in the course of meetings or events in foreign areas, but it
does not cover transportation or lodging expenses."' These subsistence
expenses may not exceed the authorized government per diem rate for
the area.18'
The new OGE speaker exception also may apply. It covers an em-
ployee who the agency assigns to participate as a speaker or panel partici-
pant, or to present information on behalf of the agency at a conference or
other event. 182 The employee may accept free attendance at the event on
the day of presentation.' 8 3 For other days of the event, a separate, but
closely related provision may apply. While the speaker provision permits
the acceptance of gifts similar to those that employees may accept under
the OGE foreign meetings rule, there are some minor variations. s4
The speaker exception may not cover any of the meetings which the
employee attends in the hypothetical example. The employee may not
qualify as a "speaker," "panel participant," or one who will "present in-
formation on behalf of the agency."' 85 Although she will interact exten-
sively with others "on behalf of her agency," she may make no formal
presentations. Her primary mission is to gather information, although
this may be difficult to accomplish without revealing an agency point of
view.
The meaning of the term "event" is also unclear.' 8 6 If read broadly, it
includes any meeting at which the official makes a presentation or sets
180. Id. § 2635.204(i).
181. Id. § 2635.204(i)(1).
182. Id. § 2635.204(g).
183. Id. § 2635.204(g)(1).
184. This option, like the foreign meeting exception, covers food, refreshments, and
entertainment and does not permit the employee to accept travel expenses or hotel accom-
modations. Id. § 2635.204(g). It differs from the foreign meeting exception in several
ways. Unlike the foreign meeting exception, it does not specifically limit the value of the
food provided, and it permits the employee to accept conference and other fees and vari-
ous materials provided to the other participants. Compare id. § 2635.204(g) (speaker pro-
vision) with id. § 2635.204(i) (foreign meeting exception). As a practical matter, the
speaker provision includes strict limitations on the value of food and refreshment that
agency employees may accept. See id. § 2635.204(g). The sponsor must furnish these items
to all attendees in a group setting which is an integral part of the event. See id.
§ 2635.204(g)(4).
185. See id. § 2635.204(g)(1).
186. See id. § 2635.204(g).
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forth an agency position. The context suggests, however, that the excep-
tion may refer only to events of a more formal nature. 187
Under the widely attended gathering rule,' 18 8 an employee may receive
from the event's sponsor the same types of expenses as the speaker provi-
sion covers, but under very different conditions. Unlike the speaker pro-
vision, the widely attended gathering rule only applies if the employee is
in leave status.189 The event must be widely attended, as defined in the
rule,190 and must be of mutual interest to a number of parties. The
agency must determine that attendance is in its interests because it will
further agency programs or operations.
An agency sometimes may give oral approval, but a writing is necessary
if the employee's official duties may affect the sponsor's interests substan-
tially.19' The agency must carefully balance the value of the employee's
attendance against the risks of improper influence of the appearance of
impropriety.
If the agency asks the employee in the hypothetical example to speak
on one day of a multi-day event, she still possibly may accept expenses
for the entire event by combining the authority of the speaker rule with
that of the widely attended gathering provision. The employee needs no
further agency permission to accept expenses for the day of her assigned
presentation. On the other days, her agency may agree to place her on
official leave and make the various determinations that the widely at-
tended gathering rule requires.
As previously noted, the new, detailed GSA agency gift rules, for all
practical purposes, cover many of the same kinds of gifts as those which
the OGE's new gift rules treat as personal gifts. The GSA rules permit
agency employees to accept expenses in connection with a "meeting or
similar function."' 92 The regulations define these as a "conference, semi-
187. The references to the terms "conference," "speaker," "panel participant" and the
reference to "free attendance" suggest more formal kinds of events. Id.
§§ 2635.204(g)(1),(4).
188. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(2)-(6) (1994).
189. Id. § 2635.204(g)(2). The rule applies to an employee on "annual" (or vacation)
leave, or an employee on leave without pay. Id. It also applies when the agency, because
of the government interest involved, has granted "official" leave and pays the employee's
salary without reducing the employee's annual leave balance. Id. The requirement that an
employee be in leave status only applies to employees who are under a leave system. Id.
190. Id. The regulation defines "widely attended" through an example, stating that "[a]
gathering is widely attended if ... it is open to members from throughout a given industry
or profession or if those in attendance represent a range of person interested in a given
matter." Id.
191. Id. § 2635.204(g)(3). A written decision also is necessary if the donor is an associ-
ation or organization, the majority of whose members have such interests. Id.
192. 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.3(a) (1994).
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nar, speaking engagement, symposium, training course, or similar event
that takes place away from the employee's official station."' 93 Thus, un-
like the OGE speaker rule, the GSA regulations allow officials to accept
expenses even if they do not disseminate any information at the meeting.
Similar to speaker rule, however, the GSA regulation does not indicate
whether it covers informal meetings designed to gather information, such
as those described in the hypothetical.
Further uncertainties exist regarding the scope of the GSA rule as ap-
plied to the hypothetical. The rule forbids acceptance of gifts in connec-
tion with events "required to carry out an agency's statutory and
regulatory functions . . . such as investigations, inspections, audits, site
visits, negotiations, or litigation." '194 The line between the activities of an
agency that are authorized and those that are required to carry out a stat-
utory mission is not as clear as the GSA apparently assumes. The GSA's
explanation does not resolve the ambiguities.' 95
Applying the GSA regulation to the hypothetical example does not
yield clear conclusions. The informational purpose of the trip seems con-
sistent with the non-operational focus of the GSA rule. On the other
hand, the information sought facilitates the performance of a critical
agency function, the development of a national trade policy. It is unclear
how helpful this information must be before the GSA regulations become
inapplicable to the trip's meetings. The language of the regulations does
not resolve whether the meetings include site visits.'9 6 In light of the
broad dictionary definition of the term site,197 it is unclear what would
constitute a site visit within the context of a travel rule.
193. Id. § 304-1.2(c)(3).
194. Id.
195. The GSA has indicated that:
In some cases, an agency may consider a particular speech or type of speech (e.g.,
training) to be essential to, and not merely in furtherance of, the agency's mission.
An agency could, for example, have a specific statutory or regulatory mandate to
educate a particular audience concerning an agency policy, program, or
operation.
Federal Travel Regulations; Acceptance of Payment from a Non-Federal Source for Travel
Expenses, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,283, 53,285 (1992). The GSA surely has not established a bright
line test. In many cases it is possible to question the importance of an event in relation to
the agency's statutory functions.
196. See 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.2(c)(3) (1994).
197. Site is defined as: "1a the spatial location of an actual or planned structure ... (as a
building, town, or monument[ ]) b: a space of ground occupied or to be occupied by a
building. 2: the place, scene, or point of something." WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICrIONARY 1102 (9th ed. 1986).
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Despite these ambiguities, the GSA rules cover a wide variety of meet-
ings. When they do apply, their scope and procedures differ markedly
from those of the other authorities described above.198
In the wake of the GSA rules, one cannot know whether an agency
gift-acceptance statute allows a gift without first deciding whether the
GSA rules provide coverage. The GSA rules purport to be, with certain
exceptions, the exclusive authority for an agency to accept the expenses
that it covers.1 99
198. Unlike the various OGE provisions, the GSA rules only cover events away from
the employee's duty station. Where the GSA rules apply, the employee may accept travel
and lodging expenses that he may not accept under any of the OGE rules. Compare 41
C.F.R. § 304-1.3 (permitting the acceptance of travel expenses) with 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)
(4) (prohibiting the acceptance of travel and lodging expenses). If approved under the
GSA rules, employees may receive expenses and benefits in excess of those which govern-
ment travel regulations authorize, provided that they meet certain conditions. See 41
C.F.R. § 304-1.3 (1993). Under the Training Act, which also permits employees to receive
travel and lodging expenses, 5 U.S.C. § 4111 (1988 Supp. V 1993), the expenses also may
exceed government travel regulation limits, but only if the expenses received do not dupli-
cate expenses which the government pays. 5 U.S.C. § 4111 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
OGE speaker or panel participant exception, which does not permit acceptance of trans-
portation and lodging expenses, imposes no explicit limit based on the government's travel
rules. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.204(g)(1), (4) (1994).
Donors under the GSA rule need not be charitable organizations or governmental enti-
ties (as they must be under the Training Act). They need not sponsor the event that the
employee attends, as they must under the OGE speaker and panel participant rule. Com-
pare 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.3 with 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(1) (1994) with 5 U.S.C. § 4111(a).
The regulation only requires that for most gifts, the meeting be "of mutual interest to the
employee's agency and the non-Federal source." 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.4(c) (1994). Where the
donor and the agency do not have such a mutual interest, the employee still will be permit-
ted to accept in-kind expenses of the kind that the non-Federal source generally provides.
Id.
Before an agency may authorize acceptance of expenses under the GSA rule, there must
be a formal review of conflict-of-interest considerations, id. § 304-1.5, and the agency, but
not the employee, must submit annual public reports on its gift acceptance activities. Id.
§ 304-1.9. On the other hand, disclosure regulations may require employees to report pay-
ments received under the Government Employees Training Act on their personal financial
disclosure report. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.105(g),(h),(n), 204 (1994); 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.9(b)
(1994) (GSA gift rules).
Most gift acceptance authorities do not impose specific reporting requirements on em-
ployees. The foreign gift statute does have its own separate reporting requirements. See 5
U.S.C. § 7342(f)(2) (1988). Moreover, employees who are subject to financial disclosure
requirements may have to include these gifts in their reports. 5 C.F.R.
§ 2634.304,.907(a)(3) (1994); 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.9(b) (1994).
199. The GSA regulations do not preempt authority to accept gifts under the Govern-
ment Employees Training Act, the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 41 C.F.R. § 304-
1.8(a) (1994), and the OGE ethics regulations. Id. § 304-1.8(a). They also allow agency
employees to accept gifts under an agency gift-acceptance statute where the GSA regula-
tions do not provide coverage. See id. § 304-1.8.
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Even if the agency's decision-making official is confident that the gift is
permissible under either the GSA rules or a separate gift-acceptance stat-
ute, the agency should not proceed until it decides which authority ap-
plies. The procedures for accepting agency gifts under these two
authorities differ dramatically. The GSA regulations include detailed
standards concerning conflict-of-interest considerations, permissible do-
nors, limitations on the amount of gifts, public disclosure, and agency pro-
cedures.200 These formal requirements do not apply to separate agency
gift-acceptance statutes.
In addition to gifts to defray travel expenses, the traveler in our hypo-
thetical example likely will receive gift offers of a more personal or quasi-
personal nature. She also may be invited to receptions sponsored by the
foreign university or others whom she encounters on the trip. She may
be asked to their homes for dinner.
Apart from the de minimis exceptions, the new regulations contain
three provisions governing these situations. Employees who obtain ad-
vance written permission may accept free attendance at certain widely
attended gatherings from an events sponsor, including receptions that oc-
cur during off duty-hours.20 ' The agency must determine that it is in its
interests for the employee to attend.202 The old model rules contained no
comparable provision, but the OGE had expressed its willingness to ap-
prove agency regulations similar to the one it has adopted in the new
rules.
2 03
A second regulation 204 allows an employee to accept, without permis-
sion, food, refreshments, and entertainment in connection with certain
social engagements.20 5 This rule applies even though the employees re-
ceive the invitation because of their official positions. The rule only ap-
plies when the invitation comes from a person who is not a prohibited
source, when other people are in attendance, and when no admission fee
is charged to anyone.20 6
Third, the new code allows employees to accept entertainment and
other gifts from donors with whom they have personal or family relation-
ships, when it is clear that these relationships, and not the employee's
200. See id. § 304-1.1 to 1.9.
201. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(2)-(6) (1994).
202. Id.
203. See Acceptance of Food and Refreshments by Executive Branch Employees, Off.
Gov't Ethics Op. 87 x 13 (Oct. 23, 1987).
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official position, are the motivating factors.20 7 This new provision is com-
parable to one found in the old model rules.208
Finally, the OGE rules authorize agencies, with OGE concurrence, to
issue supplemental rules applicable to their own employees. 20 9 These
rules may include additional provisions governing the acceptance of gifts
and may alter the effect of some of the authorities listed above.
As this limited review of the gift provisions suggests, an employee
seeking answers from the text of the rules must prepare to tread a rocky
and labyrinthine path, one that is perilous without the assistance of a
skilled guide. For the solitary travelers, danger lurks around every curve
unless they understand that common sense and a highly developed ethical
appreciation will not be sufficient to chart the course. Even diligence and
sensitivity may not help employees find acceptable answers or determine
whether they should seek permission or expert advice.
It is not safe to assume that only the codes governing agency gifts regu-
late gifts that benefit an agency. While the ethics code purports to deal
only with personal gifts, these gifts often are indistinguishable from
agency gifts. Nor should one assume that the ethics code exclusively de-
fines ethical transgressions. Indeed, a violation of the detailed GSA
agency gift rules also can result in a breach of the ethics rules.21°
One should not assume that the size of the gift or even the nature of
the donor necessarily will determine when the employee needs to obtain
advance permission. While the ethics code allows an employee to accept
substantial gifts which benefit the agency under the foreign meeting and
speaker provisions without advance permission, the Government Em-
ployees Training Act and the GSA regulations require an employee to
seek permission before accepting gifts of a similar nature. An employee
also may need to seek permission under agency gift acceptance laws.
The identity of the donors and their relationship to the agency make a
difference only under some of the rules. Under the Government Em-
ployees Training Act, donors must be tax-exempt organizations and gov-
ernmental entities.211 Under the speaker exception, they must sponsor
the event.212 The foreign meeting exception only excludes foreign gov-
207. Id. § 2635.204(b).
208. Compare id. with 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(b)(1) (1991).
209. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.105 (1994).
210. The OGE rules make clear that an employee who accepts an agency gift under
specific statutory authority does not violate the ethics rules. Id. § 2635.203(b)(8). If the
employee fails to comply precisely with the GSA rules, the gift will violate ethics rules
unless it qualifies under another provision.
211. 5 U.S.C. § 4111 (1988); 5 C.F.R. § 410.702 (1994).
212. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(1) (1994).
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ernments as donors.213 The GSA rule does not restrict donors, but the
identity of the donor affects the kind of gifts that it may give.214 Under
the agency gift-acceptance statutes, donor identity does not matter.21 5
Some rules require formal conflict-of-interest review before the agency or
its employees may accept the gift and others do not.216
Employees should not assume that reporting the gift is their agency's
responsibility, even if the gift principally benefits the government. Em-
ployees subject to financial reporting requirements must disclose the
larger gifts they receive under the Training Act, the speaker provision,
the foreign gift exception, the widely attended gathering authority, and
other such personal gifts rules. Agencies must publicly report gifts they
receive under the GSA rules, but the employee is required to keep de-
tailed records.217 Agency gift statutes require no formal reporting, either
by the employee or the agency. Both employees and agencies must re-
port some expense reimbursements and other gifts from foreign govern-
ments under a separate reporting system.218
These occasionally arbitrary distinctions could cause an employee vio-
lation for a small and seemingly minor fact variation. Sometimes, the
pivotal fact may be who says what at a meeting or the identity of the
meeting's participants. Even if another authority could sanction the ac-
ceptance of an impermissible gift, employees already would have violated
the ethics rules if they failed to obtain the advance approval that the al-
ternative provision requires. Perhaps the best advice for anyone who
truly wants to understand the new gift code is, "go to law school."
2. The Catchalls
Employees who successfully have evaded all of the hazards discussed
above ultimately must dodge the most dangerously alluring false assump-
tion, a belief that they finally have grasped the code's meaning by master-
ing its more technical and objective provisions. This misplaced
confidence will make employees perilously vulnerable to the effect of the
code's "gotcha catchalls."
213. Id. § 2635.204(i)(4).
214. 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.5(a) (1994) (stating that the identity of a non-federal source is a
factor in determining propriety of accepting a gift); id. § 304-1.4(c) (limiting the size of
gifts where the meeting or function is not of "mutual interest" to the donor and the
agency).
215. See supra note 110-13 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(3) (1994); 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.5 (1994).
217. Id. § 304-1.9.
218. 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(3), (f) (1988).
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In the new code, gotcha catchalls appear in two principal flavors, "ob-
jective" and "subjective." In either case, they ultimately can change the
apparent meaning of the code's other provisions. Their vagueness, how-
ever, discourages readers from taking them seriously.
An objective catchall asserts that the code's language must be read in
light of other laws or regulations whose meaning the reader supposedly
can ascertain. A long list of referenced authorities or authorities contain-
ing significant ambiguities can undermine certainty about the code's
meaning. Legal disputes of which even the conscientious reader may be
entirely unaware can hold the rules hostage. When the experts finally
decide how to interpret the provisions of the code, their decision becomes
an objective truth which the regulated employee presumably should have
known all along.
A subjective catchall articulates a broad ethical principle which trumps
any of the code's specific provisions. The hapless reader who concen-
trates single-mindedly on the code's more specific and objective provi-
sions may miss a very important point. Whatever may be the most
plausible meaning of these complex provisions, the code's custodians will
reverse the meaning if they believe that the result is a "bad" one.
The new ethics code contains major catchalls of both the objective and
subjective varieties. In one of the most remarkable catchalls, Subpart A
sets forth broad ethics principles similar to those of the old model
rules. 219 An agency may discipline employees for violating these princi-
ples even if they comply with the code's more specific provisions. 220 This
structure effectively creates a "backup" ethics code similar to the model
rules. It assures that despite the level of detail contained in the code's
more objective provisions, the subjectivity of the model rules may not be
notably diminished.
Although the broad principles of Subpart A do not apply to gifts which
Subpart B authorizes, 221 the gift code comes equipped with its own
catchalls, which severely undermine its objectivity. Section 2635.202(c)
provides that an employee may not accept a gift in violation of any stat-
ute, including 18 U.S.C. § 209, which bars the supplementation of govern-
ment salaries from outside sources.222 This provision is one of the gift
code's most notable objective gotcha catchalls.
219. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b) (1994); see supra note 82 (comparing the new provisions
with the provisions of the old code).
220. See Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed.
Reg., 35,006, 35,008 (Aug. 7, 1992).
221. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b), .204 (1994).
222. See id. § 2635.202(c)(4)(ii).
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On its face, this provision seems entirely reasonable. The regulations
of an executive agency cannot repeal a criminal statute. On the other
hand, for the first time, the new code authorizes many gifts that had pre-
viously been prohibited. Many of these gifts have a nexus to an em-
ployee's duties, and thus section 209 inevitably hovers over them as a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky." 223
The meaning of section 209 always has been far from certain, and the
General Accounting Office historically has taken a very expansive
224view. 24 Previous GAO opinions interpreting section 209 would have
prohibited many gifts which the new OGE regulations specifically author-
ize. While the GAO abjures any authority to issue definitive rulings on
criminal statutes, its opinions illustrate how broadly it is possible to read
section 209. More to the point, past OGE interpretations of section 209
create an irreconcilable conflict with many of the newly issued gift provi-
sions authorizing acceptance of job-related gifts. 225
The uncertainties surrounding section 209 threaten the coherence of
the entire new gift code. Ironically, the discussions over its meaning
rarely come to the attention of those millions of covered employees who
believe that the new code means precisely what it appears to say.
Despite the OGE's lack of authority to revise the criminal code, it is
hoped that these matters eventually will be clarified. An Executive order
authorizes and directs the OGE to issue interpretative regulations with
the Department of Justice's concurrence. 2 6 The OGE has announced its
intention to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking by December, 1995
with a comment period ending February, 1996.27 In the interim, the reg-
ulations instruct employees that if section 209 applies, it will bar a gift
even if the regulations seem to grant approval. 228 Thus, the new rules
quietly warn employees that they must rely on the regulations at their
own peril.229
223. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1933) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
224. See supra note 141-45 and accompanying text.
225. See discussion infra notes 231-73 and accompanying text.
226. See Exec. Order No. 12,674, § 201, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (1990), revised by Exec. Or-
der No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991).
227. See Semiannual Regulatory Agenda; The Constraint Against Private Supplemen-
tation of Salaries of Executive Branch Officials and Employees, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,381 (1994).
228. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.2040) (1994) (providing broader gift-acceptance authority for the
President and Vice-President for reasons relating to the conduct of their offices, including
those of protocol and etiquette).
229. In discussing the rules governing "Teaching, Speaking, and Writing" in the pream-
ble to the final regulations, the OGE clearly states that its rules do not interpret section
209. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed. Reg.
35,006, 35,035 (1992). The OGE states:
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Leaving these critical matters unresolved for over three years beyond
the regulations' effective date poignantly illustrates that long and detailed
codes present difficulties for both the regulated public and the regulators.
It is questionable whether the OGE should have promulgated this gift
code without first resolving the issues surrounding section 209. The
code's issuance may have been delayed unacceptably if the drafters had
taken the opportunity to settle the issues surrounding section 209. If so,
the drafters of complex codes could learn a lesson from this situation. At
some point along the spectrum of complexity, the size and detail of regu-
lation can frustrate even the regulators.
The clash between the new regulations and past OGE interpretations
of section 209 is fundamental. The OGE's past rulings strongly suggest
that an employee personally may not accept official travel expenses with-
out potentially violating section 209.230 Yet, in accepting these expenses,
the employee apparently would still comply with the language of section
2635.204 of the new gift code.
The past OGE interpretations long predate the new ethics code.
Although apparently differing from the Justice Department's approach to
section 209,231 past OGE interpretations are consistent with the tradi-
The prohibition on receipt of compensation for activities that are part of the em-
ployee's official duties, which flows from the definition at renumbered
§ 2635.807(a)(2)(i)(A), addresses conduct that may also be prohibited by 18
U.S.C. 209. However, § 2635.807 is not intended to implement or interpret section
209. The Office of Government Ethics intends to issue separate regulations inter-
preting 18 U.S.C. 209.
Id. at 35,036 (emphasis added).
230. The OGE explains that, absent appropriate statutory authority, an employee per-
sonally may not accept travel expenses to carry out official duties without potentially vio-
lating section 209. See Letter to a DAEO dated Feb. 4, 1983, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x 3,
(Feb. 4, 1983); see also Summary of Acceptance and Disclosure of Travel Expenses and
Related Gifts, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 84 x 5, (May 1, 1984). An employee personally may
accept travel expenses only if a statute such as the Training Act allows personal accept-
ance. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 4111(a) (1988). Otherwise these expenses may only be accepted
by an agency that has proper gift-acceptance authority. Id.
Conversely, in its new ethics code, the OGE authorizes personal acceptance of expenses
related to the performance of official duties. It does so without claiming to revise its inter-
pretation of section 209. See supra note 229.
It follows a fortiorari from these opinions, that an employee's risk of violating the statute
is even stronger when not in a travel status. Under such circumstances, it is the employee
that directly benefits from the gift and not the agency.
The Department of Justice has taken positions in the area of travel gifts which appear to
conflict with those of the OGE.
231. In deciding whether a payment is an illegal salary supplement, the Justice Depart-
ment places its emphasis on whether the employee or the agency benefits from the pay-
ment. An August 10, 1922 Attorney General opinion held that the agency and not the
employee would be the beneficiary of a gift of travel expenses. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 273,275.
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tional GAO view.2 32 Moreover, the old model rules reflect these inter-
pretations.233 The lack of conformity between the language of the new
rules and the OGE's interpretations of section 209 creates serious doubt
about the meaning and viability of both.
The conflict between the old interpretations and the new rules per-
vades other important areas. An entirely new provision in ethics regula-
tions allows an employee's spouse to accept certain expenses while
accompanying the employee to an official speech.234 This provision is in-
consistent with extant OGE interpretations of section 209.
The "accompanying spouse" provision is an adjunct to both the
speaker rule and the widely-attended gathering exception. 235 It applies
when the rules authorize a government employee to accept free attend-
ance at the event.236 Under this provision, the agency also may allow the
employee to accept similar benefits for an accompanying spouse if others
in attendance generally will be accompanied by spouses. 237
Past OGE rulings challenge the legality of the spousal gifts which its
new provisions appear to allow.238 The OGE has held that if the spouse
of a government employee accepts a free trip in connection with the em-
ployee's official duties merely because of the marital relationship, the gift
may be an illegal supplementation of the official's salary.239 Acceptance
of expenses by official speakers' spouses is squarely within the section 209
danger zone because the speaker provision applies only when the em-
ployee is performing official duties.
240
The opinion also found that acceptance would not have violated the predecessor to section
209. Id. at 275-76.
A May 13, 1981 opinion by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel appears
to take the same view. 5Op. Off. Legal Counsel 126 (1981). This opinion involved a gift of
legal services by a private foundation to assist a presidential cabinet nominee in preparing
for confirmation hearings during a period of presidential transition. Id. at 128. Although
this case did not involve a government employee, its rationale supports the view that per-
sonal benefit to an employee is instrumental in deciding whether a gift violates section 209.
Id. at 128. The apparently divergent approaches of the OGE and the Justice Department
create further uncertainties about the meaning of section 209.
232. See 46 Comp. Gen. 689 (1967).
233. See 5 C.F.R. § 735.202(f) (1991) (citing 46 Comp. Gen. 689 (1967)).
234. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(g)(6) (1994).
235. See id. §§ 2635.204(g)(1),(2).
236. Id. § 2635.204(g)(6). Acceptable expenses include food, refreshments, entertain-
ment, instruction, and materials furnished to attendees. Id. § 2635.204(g)(4).
237. Id. § 2635.204(g)(6).
238. See Letter to a DAEO dated Feb. 4, 1983, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x 3 (Feb. 4,
1983).
239. Id.
240. The new GSA and OGE rules allow spousal gifts in other circumstances, but not
all such gifts come under the cloud of the previous OGE opinions.
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The language of the new ethics code produces other conflicts with the
OGE's past interpretations of section 209. The de minimis provision per-
mits employees to accept small appreciation gifts in connection with the
performance of official duties. 241 For example, an official speaker appro-
priately might receive a modest alarm clock for explaining the delays in
carrying out an important agency program. The rule may allow a postal
worker to keep the annual box of Christmas cookies offered to venerate
her proven agility in evading the jaws of the resident canine.
Prior to the new rules, acceptance of appreciation gifts raised serious
questions under the illegal gratuities statute.242 The statute bars employ-
ees from receiving items of value for or because of any official act.243
Moreover, the old model rules did not contain specific provisions al-
lowing employees to receive appreciation gifts from prohibited sources.
Any reward to an employee for performing government services also is
suspect under section 209, which prohibits supplementation of the em-
ployee's salary.2 '
The new regulations allow these small gifts. 245 They explicitly exempt
from the gratuities statute, gifts (such as de minimis appreciation gifts)
The acceptance of spousal gifts under the GSA regulations does not appear to conflict
with past OGE interpretations of section 209. The GSA rules permit the agency to author-
ize gifts of travel expenses for a spouse accompanying an employee to "a meeting or simi-
lar function." 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.3 (1994). The gift is acceptable only if the agency
determines that the spouse's presence is in the interests of the agency. See id. § 304-1.3(b).
This rule appears consistent with OGE Opinion 83 x 3. See supra note 231 (discussing
OGE Opinion 83 x 3). Opinion 83 x 3 allows an agency with gift-acceptance authority to
accept expenses for an official's spouse if the agency believes the spouse's presence will
further the agency's mission. Id. Under the GSA rule, the agency may consider whether
the spouse will participate in substantive programs or operations in deciding that it has an
interest in the spouses attendance. 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.3 (1994). Mere attendance at sub-
stantive sessions, however, may not meet the requirements that the OGE set forth in Opin-
ion 83 x 3. See supra note 230.
In United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1979), however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the payment of costs for a
trip of a government employee and his spouse did not violate section 209. Id. at 970.
While the court found that the application of the statute to spousal gifts was possible under
some circumstances, it found no violation in the instant case, since the payments did not
relate to the employee's official duties. Id. The court considered, among other factors,
that the employee was on leave from the agency during the period covered by the pay-
ments. Id.
241. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) (1994); see also supra note 158-59 (discussing the de
minimis exception in the new gift code).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (1988).
243. Id.
244. 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1988); see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
245. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) ex. 2 (1994).
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which are acceptable under section 2635.204.246 On the other hand, cov-
erage under section 209 remains an open question.
Appreciation gifts raise the specter of a section 209 violation because
they reward an employee for official services. In support of the OGE's
clear approval of these gifts, one might suggest two arguments. First, the
gift is legal because only cash gifts can violate the ban on accepting a
salary or supplementation of salary from an outside source.247 Second,
section 209 contains an implicit de minimis test, and small appreciation
gifts which agency employees accept under the OGE regulation fall be-
low that threshold.
The OGE's past opinions explicitly reject both arguments. In discuss-
ing items given to an employee in appreciation for an official speech, the
OGE has determined that section 209 applies to anything of monetary
value 2 8 and that no de minimis exemption exists.249
Even where past OGE interpretations of section 209 do not directly
clash with the new regulations, they may provide an uncertain guide for
both employees and ethics counselors. Some OGE opinions interpreting
section 209 reach unexpected results. In others, the OGE appears to shift
its position considerably over time.
The treatment of outstanding public service awards is a case in point.
The new regulations allow employees to accept both major and minor
gifts in connection with bona fide awards for outstanding public service or
achievement.250 More rigorous requirements apply to larger gifts.
251
246. Id. § 2635.202(b).
247. Students of the conflict-of-interest laws had raised this issue at an early date. In
the view of Bayless Manning, it would have been possible to interpret the word salary as a
fixed annual or periodic payment for services. However, the term was given a broader
meaning whenever the issue was passed upon. See MANNING, supra note 26, at 160-61. In
its study on the conflict-of-interest laws, the New York Bar committee observed that the
word salary had been and probably would be construed to include almost any kind of
transfer of value to the employee that appears to be compensation. NEW YORK BAR
STUDY, supra note 2, at 64.
In his concurring opinion in Crandon, Justice Scalia differs with the prevailing adminis-
trative interpretations. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168-84 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In his view, the statute only applies to periodic cash payments, the traditional
meaning of the term salary. Id. The Court did not adopt this view in its majority opinion.
Id. at 152.
248. Letter to DAEO dated Apr. 2, 1985, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 85 x 4 (Apr. 2, 1985).
249. Id.
250. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(d)(1) (1994).
251. Minor awards include gifts of $200 or less, other than cash or investment interests.
Id. Agency employees may not accept these gifts from donors who have interests that may
be affected substantially by the performance or nonperformance of the employee's official
duties. Id. These restrictions also apply to gifts from any association or organization, if a
majority of its members have such interests. Id.
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Agency employees may accept these awards, like other gifts allowed
under section 2635.204 of the gift code, only if they are consistent with
section 209. While some have argued that awards in recognition of out-
standing government service are the clearest example of salary supple-
mentation,25 2 both the OGE and the Department of Justice consistently
have permitted them.
25 3
It is very difficult to identify the factors which are crucial to the OGE's
interpretation. The old model rules permitted employees to accept
awards for outstanding public service only from various organizations of
a nonprofit charitable or civic nature.254 In one opinion, the OGE sug-
gested that the donor's charitable status was relevant to its position.255 It
Major awards must meet additional requirements. Id. This category includes gifts of
cash or investment interests or gifts in excess of $200. Id. Agency employees may accept
major awards only when an ethics official determines, in writing, that the awards are a part
of an established program of recognition that meets two conditions: the awards must be
made on a regular basis or be funded to assure the continuity of the awards program. Id.
They also must be made pursuant to written standards. Id.
252. Justice Scalia vigorously asserted this position in Crandon:
An example is employee receipt of cash awards from nonprofit organizations
for meritorious public service. Unless one believes that the statutory term "as
compensation" (or its predecessor term "in connection with") imports the com-
mon-law requirement of bargained-for consideration-which no one contends-
it is difficult to imagine any lump-sum payments more clearly covered by § 209(a)
than cash grants conferred specifically to reward the work of Government
officials.
Crandon, 494 U.S. at 178. Justice Scalia supports a considerably narrower view of the
statute than that adopted by the Court, the Justice Department or the OGE. Id. at 171-72.
He believes that anomalous administrative interpretations, such as those involving em-
ployee awards, are caused by too broad a reading of section 209. Id. at 178.
253. See Letter to a DAEO dated July 21, 1983, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x 10 (July 21,
1983) (citing Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) to Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President (April 7, 1977); Letter from
Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to Stuart R. Reichart, Acting
General Counsel, Department of the Air Force (April 7, 1977); and Letter from Paul A.
Sweeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to Gerald Morgan, Special Counsel to
the President) (June 26, 1956); see also Letter to a DAEO dated July 26, 1983, Off. Gov't
Ethics Op. 83 x 11 (July 26, 1983).
254. 5 C.F.R. § 735.203(e)(3) (1991).
255. In Opinion 85 x 16, the OGE argues that section 209 does not disfavor awards
from charitable organizations. Letter to a Private Org.'s Attorney dated Sept. 30, 1985,
Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 85 x 16 (Sept. 30, 1985). In support of this view, it cites the Training
Act, enacted after the predecessor to section 209, which permits employees to accept cer-
tain gifts from these organizations without potentially violating section 209. Id. (citing
Gov't Employees Training Act, 5 U.S.C. § 4111(a) (1984)). The OGE does not, in this
opinion, take account of the legislative history of section 209, which it had recognized in an
earlier opinion. See Letter to an Employee dated Oct. 19, 1983, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x
15 (Oct. 19, 1983). Alleged incidents involving charitable foundations preceded section
209's predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1914 (1958).
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obviously is not a critical factor because the new provisions make no dis-
tinction between charitable and profit-making donors.256
The OGE had made clear that charitable status was not dispositive
long before it issued the new regulations. In a 1983 opinion, the OGE
reviewed a proposed charitable trust to help needy federal employees
meet a variety of personal needs, including medical and educational
aid.257 The OGE declined to approve the arrangement under section
209.258 It ruled that interpretation of section 209 requires a case-by-case
approach, considering a variety of factors, where no single factor is deter-
minative.2 15 9 These factors include the intent of both the recipient and
donor and any substantial relationship or pattern of dealings between the
employee's agency and the donor.260 The limitation of the trust's benefits
to past, present, and future employees of the office was crucial to the
2611983 opinion.
In the 1983 opinion, the OGE rejected the charitable trust under sec-
tion 209 because it helped only government employees and former em-
ployees.262 In 1993, the OGE explicitly rejected the usefulness of its 1983
test.263 It eliminated from its proposed regulations a provision that would
have barred awards programs if they were limited to federal employ-
ees.264 Several commenters had recommended the elimination of this re-
striction. In accepting their recommendations, the OGE stated: "On
further review, the OGE agrees that the condition is neither necessary
nor desirable, and it has been deleted. 2 65
While the OGE does not further explain the reversal of its position in
the new regulations, a 1993 opinion 266 concerning employee legal defense
funds suggests that its interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Crandon v. United States267 may have influenced its new position. The
OGE's 1993 opinion overruled a 1985 advisory opinion which criticized
256. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(d) (1994).







263. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(d)(1) (1994).
264. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 56 Fed.
Reg. 33,778, 33,797 (1991) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(d)(1)(ii) (1994)).
265. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed.
Reg. 35,006, 35,018 (1992).
266. Letter to an Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official dated August 30, 1993,
Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 93 x 21 (Aug. 30, 1993).
267. 494 U.S. 152 (1989).
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an employee defense fund limited to one federal employee under section
209268 and approved a fund comparable to the one it had disapproved in
1985.269
The OGE's change was based on Crandon's broader rationale rather
than on its explicit holding.27 ° Perhaps for this very reason, it is difficult
to determine how the OGE's interpretation of Crandon will affect other
past interpretations of the statute. It is plausible, but by no means cer-
tain, that the OGE's approval of employee award programs and legal de-
fense funds will extend to charitable welfare funds benefitting only
current and former federal employees. The ultimate result is uncertain
because the OGE has not expressly overruled Opinion 83 x 15, which
criticized these funds.27' Moreover, in light of the OGE's emphasis on a
case-by-case and factor-by-factor analysis, its failure to supersede Opin-
ion 83 x 15 may not be mere oversight.
In short, the OGE's concept of section 209 is not clear from an analysis
of its opinions. This lack of clarity assumes critical importance for
employees seeking to understand whether the statute, as interpreted by
the OGE, overrules the apparently conflicting provisions of its new
regulations.
The assertion that the new regulations conflict with the OGE's past
interpretations of section 209 is not intended to be a criticism of the pol-
268. Letter to a Private Attorney dated December 12, 1985, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 85 x
19 (Dec. 12, 1985).
269. Id. Donors established the 1985 fund to assist a government employee support a
grievance against his employing agency. Id. The donors were personal friends of the em-
ployee and had no business dealings with the agency. Id. Nothing in the 1985 opinion
suggests that the donors were attempting to reward the conduct that gave rise to the griev-
ance. Id. Despite the factors, the OGE, in 1985, did not permit the fund. Id. The fact that
the fund benefitted only one government employee and arose out of official duties out-
weighed the favorable considerations. Id.
270. The OGE's 1993 opinion allowing a comparable fund imposed specific conditions
on the maintenance of the fund and did not excuse the employee from otherwise comply-
ing with the rules governing gifts. Letter to an Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Offi-
cial dated August 30, 1993, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 93 x 21 (Aug. 30, 1993). The Crandon
case itself did not deal with benefits for current employees. In Crandon, the Supreme
Court held that section 209 was inapplicable to severance payments made before the recip-
ients became federal employees. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 163-64.
In 1993, the OGE based its view of legal defense funds on Crandon's refusal to extend
section 209(a) beyond what the text clearly warranted. The OGE concluded that the fund
in its 1993 opinion would not violate the statutory purposes, as Crandon articulated them.
Letter to an Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official dated August 30, 1993, Off.
Gov't Ethics Op. 93 x 21 (Aug. 30, 1993). It also stressed that the Crandon majority would
resolve any ambiguity under section 209(a) by applying a "rule of lenity." Id.
271. Letter to an Employee dated Oct. 19, 1993, Off. Gov't Ethics Op. 83 x 15 (Oct. 19,
1983). In this opinion, the OGE declined to approve a trust under § 209 because its benefi-
ciaries were limited to past, present, and future employees of a particular office.
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icy choices that the OGE has made in these rules. Rather, the issuance of
comprehensive government-wide ethics rules with which this law is inex-
tricably intertwined provides an excellent opportunity to reconsider and
clarify the meaning of an old and confusing statute.
Regrettably, these new rules did not reflect any reconsideration of sec-
tion 209. Instead, the OGE has reserved judgment on the statutory ques-
tions, promising to address them at another time. 272 The regulated
employee, on the other hand, had to face these issues immediately, una-
ware that the words might not mean what they appeared to say, and that
one provision may withdraw permission which another resonantly
heralded.
Section 209 raises issues that, admittedly, are very difficult to address.
It is no longer clear what evils this provision seeks to prevent. Revisions
of the conflict-of-interest laws during the 1960s subsequently legalized the
purported abuses that explicitly had prompted the enactment of section
209.273 A historical lack of clarity in distinguishing between personal and
agency gifts makes a resolution of these issues extremely problematic.
These matters await a full and direct debate, and there is some historical
difference in perspective between the written opinions of the OGE and
those of the Department of Justice.
While these issues may be hard to resolve, the difficulty did not warrant
the failure to settle them. Promulgating gift rules such as the new govern-
ment-wide code without adequately addressing the section 209 issues is
like building a bridge halfway across a crocodile-infested river and post-
ing road signs inviting motorists to cross. Road crews will not avoid
problems by hoisting more signs seeking pardon for the inconvenience of
the ongoing construction.
So far, there is no evidence of a reptilian feast. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine prosecutions under section 209 for actions that the new rules ap-
pear to invite. A resolution to this conflict eventually will emerge, but
until the issuance of new section 209 regulations, many options remain
available. The OGE could choose to reaffirm the positions taken in the
rules, despite its prior inconsistent interpretations of the statute. Alterna-
tively, in egregious cases, it could interpose the statute to bar actions
272. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 57 Fed.
Reg. 35,006, 35,036 (1992).
273. Gifts to "dollar-a-year" agency employees triggered the predecessor to section 209.
18 U.S.C. § 1914 (1958), repealed by Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119,
1126. Congress revised the 1962 statute to permit such gifts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 202, 209 (1988).
It established a category of "special Government employees" who were loosely attached to
the federal workforce. Id. The new law exempted special government employees and un-
compensated employees from the provisions of section 209. Id.
19941
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which the language of the regulations appears to permit. One casualty of
this open-options approach is the purported objectivity of the new code.
Where two provisions directly conflict, it is impossible to predict how a
decision maker will resolve the conflict.
The gift code also contains a notable example of a subjective gotcha
catchall. This provision illustrates the difficulties arising from efforts to
fine tune an already complex code. The regulations provide, notwith-
standing any of the exceptions to the gift-acceptance ban, that employees
may not accept gifts from the same or different sources so frequently as to
make a reasonable person believe that the employees are using their pub-
lic office for private gain.274
In one stroke, this provision imports into the new code all of the broad
subjectivity that was the hallmark of many provisions of the old model
rules.275 Regardless of how permissible a gift might be under one of the
more objective provisions of the code, a recipient must refuse the gift if it
is one of a series of gifts made with undue frequency.
The implications of this rule are uncertain. The drafters carefully
crafted each of the specific exceptions to the ban on gift-acceptance to
ensure that the code denied permission to accept gifts when acceptance
would create the appearance of using public office for private gain. The
"too often" provision attempts to close a gap in the rules which actually
may not exist.
As discussed above, some exceptions, such as the foreign meeting rule
and the speaker rule benefit the agency rather than the individual em-
ployee. Others, such as the widely attended gathering rule and the ac-
companying spouse provisions, require specific advance agency approval.
It is questionable whether the potential for abuse of these rules is so sig-
nificant that it justifies the additional subjectivity which the too often pro-
vision creates.
The new de minimis exception does permit acceptance of clearly per-
sonal gifts without advance approval. The unsupervised acceptance of
gifts is a cause for concern. The dollar limits, however, have been cali-
brated carefully to avoid any appearance that the gifts are excessive. In-
deed, the final rules substantially reduced the originally proposed
threshold levels to take account of these concerns. 276
274. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(c)(3) (1994).
275. A provision of the old model rules embodied a comparable "too often" concept. It
permitted employees to accept from prohibited sources "food and refreshments of nominal
value on infrequent occasions in the ordinary course of a luncheon or dinner meeting or
other meeting or on an inspection tour where an employee may properly be in attend-
ance." Id. § 735.202(b)(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
276. See 57 Fed. Reg. 35,006, 35,015-16 (1992).
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The establishment of very specific limits will lead employees to believe
that gifts within the threshold amounts are safe from any improper ap-
pearances. Employees are likely to ignore the effects of the too often
rule because the specificity of the bright-line numerical thresholds will
overwhelm the rule's vagueness. The regulations establish that gifts
within the specified dollar limits are only probably safe.
In adopting the too often rule, the drafters have displayed ambivalence
toward the thresholds which they incorporated into the regulations. If
the new limits are still overly generous, further downward adjustments
would have been more consistent with the original purposes of the de
minimis provision. The drafters intended the de minimis rule to provide
a single exception that would be easier for employees to remember and
apply.277 The reintroduction of a subjective too often test eliminates the
advantages of the objective numerical test, yet still requires employees to
memorize the numbers. The too often test may make it virtually impossi-
ble for an employee to ascertain whether a proposed gift is lawful without
a written opinion from an appropriate official.278
How often is too often? For the several organizations that opposed any
de minimis exception,279 once obviously is more than enough. The OGE
has not accepted this view. It remains to be seen what principles it will
apply to test the appropriateness of gifts which otherwise satisfy its more
objective standards. The regulations do not succeed in establishing a co-
herent conceptual framework for resolving this issue.
The OGE attempts to offer some guidance. The regulations provide an
example to explain the too often test.280 In this example, an agency
purchasing agent routinely meets with representatives of pharmaceutical
manufacturers to gather information about new company products.281
The official's busy schedule requires him to schedule these meetings regu-
277. Id. at 35,016.
278. In the formulation of its final regulations, the OGE noted a commenter's argu-
ment that the too often test might place employees in the position of having their judg-
ments second-guessed. Id. at 35,012. Employees therefore might choose to seek the
"insulation of ethics advice." Id. The OGE nevertheless declined to delete the too often
rule. However, it did remove another provision of the proposed rules which would have
barred a gift:
from a person who "has interests that may be substantially affected by the per-
formance or nonperformance of the employee's official duties under circum-
stances where the timing and nature of the gift would cause a reasonable person
to question the employee's impartiality in the manner affecting that person."
Id. at 35,011-12.
279. Id. at 35,015.
280. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(c)(3) ex. 1 (1994) (discussing the improper acceptance of
meals by a purchasing agent from a manufacturer representative).
281. Id.
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larly during his lunch hours, and the representative routinely arrives at
his office bearing a sandwich and a soft drink for his consumption.282
Even though the market value of each lunch is less than six dollars and
the aggregate value from any one manufacturer does not exceed the fifty
dollar annual limitation on de minimis gifts, the regulations find that the
practice of accepting even these modest gifts regularly is improper.283
Of course, it would be useful to identify those elements of the cited
example which make acceptance of the lunches improper. Regrettably,
other provisions of the code hinder efforts to draw any clear lessons from
this example.
Assume that the purchasing agent rearranges his schedule to substitute
regular late afternoon conferences for his lunchtime sessions. During
each of these meetings, tea and crumpets are served. Assume that the
value of this hospitality approaches three dollars per session and that dur-
ing a six-month period, it becomes necessary to have over one hundred
meetings with the same manufacturer's representative.
After six months, the value of the food and refreshments approaches
three hundred dollars from a single source, but the purchasing agent has
not breached an ethics rule. It is irrelevant under the ethics code
whether, during the rest of the year, the purchasing agent's rate of har-
vesting crumpets decreases.
The reason for the agent's good fortune is section 2635.203(b)(1), of
the gift code, which excludes from the definition of gift "[m]odest items
of food and refreshments, such as soft drinks, coffee and donuts, offered
other than as part of a meal."284 Excluding these items from the defini-
tion of gift means that the purchasing agent can accept the gifts without
regard to the dollar limitations contained in the de minimis provision. De
minimis limits apply only to gifts. 285 Moreover, the too often rule does
not apply because it only governs gifts that employees accept under one
of Subpart B's exceptions.286
The essential difference between the crumpet and the sandwich is that
the sandwich is served as a part of a meal and, therefore, is included in
the definition of gift. The crumpet, on the other hand, serves other
purposes.
Thus, we return to our original inquiry: How often is too often? The
answer appears to be that if the gift is a six dollar sandwich, even the
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. § 2635.203(b)(1).
285. Id. § 2635.204(a).
286. Id. § 2635.202(c).
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modest thresholds of the de minimis provisions provide insufficient pro-
tections against abuse. If it is a crumpet, the sky is the limit.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The new ethics code has some ambiguities and inconsistencies, but
these criticisms do not detract from its ground breaking achievements.
The new code dramatically abandons many of the brittle rigidities of the
old model gift rules. Several provisions reflect the efforts of the drafters
to increase flexibility, while avoiding the appearance that officials are us-
ing their public office for private gain. Whether or not one agrees with
the specifics, the OGE has employed a thoughtful and constructive ap-
proach. Unrealistically cramped restrictions foster the unwarranted be-
lief that ethics rules concern insignificant matters. Moreover, as Michael
Josephson properly has noted, unduly restrictive rules can make law-
breakers out of honest people without deterring the conduct of bad faith
violators.287
To appraise this code effectively, one must view it broadly. The success
of any ethics code ultimately is judged by how thoroughly employees ap-
ply it to their jobs. Poorly articulated regulations may discourage some
bad conduct, but they also will deter actions that are useful and construc-
tive. The effects of an ethics code are very difficult to measure
objectively.
A. Recommendations
Despite the new gift code's improvements, serious flaws remain. The
new code provides a useful lesson for those engaged in the drafting of all
codes, and particularly ethics codes. There is a point beyond which even
the most clever and principled efforts to give full and objective guidance
become counterproductive. Even this small portion of a much larger
body of new ethics regulation may be too extensive and complex for em-
ployees to fathom and for its custodians to manage effectively.
Some problems arise because the new code builds upon the unresolved
conceptual issues underlying the old model rules. Elaborating on these
uncertainties does not improve the code's clarity. The old theoretical
anomalies lead to definitions that agency employees must memorize
rather than intuitively understand and lead to the confusion surrounding
18 U.S.C. § 209.
287. Hearings, supra note 2, at 171 (statement of Michael Josephson, President of the
Josephson Institute for the Advancement of Ethics).
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Additional complications arise from the detailed safeguards established
to prevent abuse of the code's new flexibility. The unintended conse-
quences of these well-intended efforts include arbitrary distinctions for
which there is no clear theoretical justification. Arbitrary distinctions im-
pede understanding and detract from the moral force of the document.
Like many complex mechanisms, this gift code demands an unaccept-
ably high level of effort and attention from its managers and is subject to
frequent breakdowns. The inability to resolve in advance the critically
important issues surrounding section 209 is a prime example.
1. Reconcile the Conflicts Between the New Gift Code and the
OGE's Prior Statutory Interpretations Under Section 209
It is hoped that the OGE and the Department of Justice eventually will
reconcile the conflict between the code's specific provisions and the
OGE's prior statutory interpretations of section 209.288 The experience
with section 209 strongly suggests, however, that the new code's complex-
ity will continue to pose serious management challenges. Practical expe-
rience inevitably will raise a profusion of previously unanticipated
ambiguities. A special source of uncertainty will be the relationship be-
tween the code's specific provisions and its gotcha catchalls.
If the OGE or the agencies do not resolve these difficult issues, individ-
ual employees will have to handle them without the benefit of legal ad-
vice. There is no reason to expect that the OGE will have the resources
to handle an explosion of legal disputes or that employees and agencies
will resolve these problems consistently.
2. Consolidate Some of the Existing Gift Authorities
The complexity of the new gift rules is only partially the responsibility
of its drafters. Additional complications result from a proliferation of
legal authorities over which the drafters have no control. The Ethics Re-
form Act, for example, mandates the GSA rules governing certain agency
travel gifts and the OGE rules covering personal gifts. 289 The Procure-
ment Integrity Act regulates gifts to procurement officials.29° The OPM
issued special rules which apply to training and meeting expense gifts
288. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (discussing the need for regulations
interpreting section 209).
289. See supra note 154 (discussing GSA and OGE gift acceptance authorities).
290. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 796 as
amended by Office of Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-679,
§ 6, 102 Stat. 4055, 4063-68 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 423).
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under the authority of the Government Employees Training Act.29'
Moreover, Congress has passed a number of agency gift-acceptance stat-
utes in what it has considered meritorious cases. Congress enacted the
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act,292 in response to constitutional pro-
scriptions. Because of this fragmentation of statutory authority, it is diffi-
cult for the drafters of the principal gift code to give employees a clear,
complete, and consistent picture of the applicable rules.
Congress should consolidate some of the existing gift authorities and
make it easier for drafters to develop a more coherent and comprehensi-
ble code.29 3 It should repeal provisions of the Training Act which permit
employees to accept training and meeting expenses. Where the Training
Act now provides broader authority than that available under the OGE
and the GSA rules, the personal or agency gift acceptance rules could be
expanded to cover these situations.294 For many years, the Training Act
provided the broadest government-wide permission to accept meeting-
related expenses. Today, the GSA or the OGE gift-acceptance rules
cover much of the same ground. There is no convincing reason for con-
tinuing this separate, narrow-based program.
291. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (citing and discussing the Govern-
ment Employees Training Act).
292. 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (1988).
293. In light of the origins of the Procurement Integrity Act and its subsequent legisla-
tive history, it is unlikely that Congress would consider seriously any proposal to repeal the
special provisions restricting gifts to procurement officials. The OGE noted that Congress
had overturned prior efforts to conform the procurement integrity gift rules with the old
agency standards of conduct. Letter to a designated Agency Ethics Official dated Jan. 30,
1991, Off. of Gov't Ethics Op. 91 x 7 (Jan. 30, 1991). It points out that procurement integ-
rity regulations issued in May, 1989 adopted definitions that would have enabled procure-
ment officials to accept any gifts that the old agency standards of conduct would have
allowed; Id. In November, 1989, Congress amended the statute to preclude the accommo-
dation to agency standards of conduct and to require a single, uniform, government-wide
procurement integrity limit on gifts to procurement officials. Id. The new ethics regula-
tions make clear that both the procurement integrity requirements and the ethics rules
apply to procurement officials. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) ex. 5 (1994).
Surely, there are strong policy reasons for imposing tough gift acceptance rules on those
actively involved in the procurement process. On the other hand, tight regulation also
could be achieved by integrating the rules governing procurement officials with the govern-
ment-wide gift code. Procurement officials are subject to both codes, and the split location
of the regulations makes it difficult for procurement officials to obtain an integrated over-
view of their obligations. The integration of the codes could assist in avoiding any unneces-
sary conceptual inconsistencies. The OGE has initiated this integration by specifically
referring to the procurement integrity requirements in an example. Id.
294. As interpreted by the OPM, the Training Act does provide broader authority than
the GSA rules in certain respects. It permits acceptance of training and meeting expenses
even if the employee is not in travel status or is not on duty. See 5 C.F.R. § 410.701(a)
(1994). Moreover the Act, unlike the OGE gift-acceptance authorities, permits the accept-
ance of transportation expenses. See id. § 410.702.
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The non-profit or governmental status of Training Act donors no
longer seems to be a sufficient basis for maintaining a separate statutory
structure. The GSA and the OGE rules treat gifts from charities and
public entities like any other donations. These rules properly focus on
potential appearances of partiality and improper influence rather than
the non-profit status of the donor.
Training Act procedures for accepting gifts differ from those appearing
in other codes, resulting in confusion. An employee who mistakenly fol-
lows the wrong procedures can face serious consequences. 295 The Train-
ing Act creates unnecessary legal distinctions that interfere with the
clarity and comprehensibility of the gift-acceptance rules. There is no jus-
tification to retain separate Training Act authority for accepting meeting-
related gifts.
3. The GSA's Agency Travel Gift Authority Should Be Transferred
to the OGE
Transferring the GSA's authority over the agency travel gift program to
the OGE would improve the clarity and efficiency of the gift rules. A
transfer would help achieve the goals of defining personal and agency
gifts more precisely and distinguishing between them.
The functional relationships between the agency and personal gift pro-
grams suggest that one agency should administer both programs. Ac-
cepting agency travel gifts invariably raises ethics issues. Ethics
provisions of the GSA rules seek to prevent the appearance of improper
influence by donors.296 The GSA is required to consult with the OGE
before issuing its rules. 297 Under the GSA program, agencies now must
submit gift reports to the OGE.298 At the OGE, the government's princi-
pal expert on ethics questions, a cadre of trained counselors is prepared
to provide advice on the ethical implications of agency gifts. In addition,
real world situations can involve both personal and agency gifts. Com-
prehensive advice may require consideration of both issues.29 9
The strongest reason for a transfer of authority is to improve the
chance that the historically blurred distinction between personal and
agency gifts will be reviewed fully and authoritatively. It is much more
295. See supra notes 198, 210, and 230; see also 5 U.S.C. § 104 app. (Supp. V 1993)
(imposing substantial civil penalties on those who willfully fail to file or report any re-
quired information on personal financial disclosure reports).
296. 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.5 (1993).
297. 31 U.S.C. § 1353(a) (Supp. V 1993).
298. 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.9 (1994).
299. For these reasons, the GSA and the OGE rules cross reference each other. See id.
§ 304-1.8(a)(4) (1993); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(b)(8)(i), .204(a), .807(a)(4)(iii) (1994).
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difficult to achieve clarity when two agencies each have legal responsibil-
ity to plot the single boundary that separates their two programs. 31111
4. Policy Should Govern the Gift Acceptance Rules, Not Conflicting
and Arbitrary Definitions
Drafters should abolish the current array of specific, arbitrary, and con-
flicting definitions. The new definitions of personal and agency gifts
should make intuitive sense to employees and should be based on the
simple common sense yardstick of who actually benefits from the gift.
The current ambiguities threaten the coherence of the gift code and set
dangerous traps for unwary employees. Employees cannot develop an
intuitive understanding of the personal gift rules without knowing what
constitutes a personal gift. The lack of coherent gift definitions also con-
tributes to the perilous obscurity in the interpretation of section 209,
which is now awaiting resolution by the OGE and the Department of
Justice.
Responsible agencies have never articulated the rationale that distin-
guishes personal and agency gifts clearly. Concepts of personal ethics tra-
ditionally have been mingled with those involving agency gifts in an
intellectual pot au feu from which no distinct flavors emerge.
The new OGE rules shed no light on these definitional mysteries. No
clear theory unites the many specific gift definitions in the code. The
OGE categorization of a gift as an agency gift, a personal gift, or a non-
gift, does not appear to depend on whether the agency or the employee
benefits personally or whether the item relates to the performance of offi-
cial duties.
The OGE should exclude gifts benefitting the agency from the defini-
tion of personal gifts. Under the present system, one must acknowledge
that these overly broad and arbitrary definitions sometimes serve a useful
purpose. The OGE rules allow employees to accept harmless gifts which
the GSA rules do not allow. A clearer and more rigorous approach, how-
ever, would permit agency employees to accept such gifts under the
agency gift-acceptance authority.
5. The GSA Travel Gift Rules Should Cover Meetings Required to
Carry Out the Agency's Statutory or Regulatory Functions
If the OGE has adopted a greatly expanded definition of personal gifts,
the GSA, to date, has taken an artificially narrow view of its authority.
300. Under the current structure, the OGE and the GSA closely cooperate with each
other. Compare 5 C.F.R. § 2635.201 (OGE overview) with 41 C.F.R. § 304-1.2 (general
applicability of statute).
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The law allows the GSA to authorize travel gifts covering any meeting
relating to the employee's official duties.3" 1 The GSA's current rules ap-
pear to cover primarily meetings of an informational or educational na-
ture and not those required to carry out the agency's statutory or
regulatory functions. The meaning of these limitations is far from clear.
The GSA's reason for limiting its coverage is not convincing. It wants
to avoid the impression that programs and services closely tied to the
agency's mission are only available to those who can afford to pay." 2
While this concern is legitimate, the OGE ethics rules already may permit
some of the same kinds of gifts that GSA declines to cover, although not
to the same extent as under the GSA rules. In addition, agencies with
statutory gift-acceptance authority have virtually unlimited permission to
accept travel expenses related to the performance of the agency's mission
without the GSA safeguards. Extending the GSA rules to cover these
gifts would eliminate this untrammeled agency authority and bring these
gifts under the extensive protections which the GSA rules provide.30 3
Finally, drafters must recognize that in an era of tight budgets, an offer
to pay the expenses of a speech also can distort the priorities of high
agency officials. When agency funds are low, the informational meeting
or the optional speech at "Paradise Village" may be the first casualty,
unless an outside donor is willing to pay these expenses.
The better solution to the GSA's concern over the appearance of
outside influence rests in assuring that agencies establish tight administra-
tive safeguards. Agencies must be especially wary of gifts from entities
that they regulate, whether these gifts relate to speeches, training ses-
sions, or other activities. Agency officials must review gift offers from
these sources carefully. Agencies must not accept any gifts that may in
any way compromise the integrity of the agency mission or the appear-
ance of impartiality. Extending the GSA rule to cover additional travel-
related gifts facilitates the establishment of such safeguards in many
cases.
6. Agency and Personal Gifts Should Be Distinguished Under the
OGE's Gift Acceptance Rules
The OGE should make another important change in its ethics regula-
tions to improve the separation between agency and personal gifts. Re-
301. See 31 U.S.C. § 1353 (Supp. V 1993).
302. Federal Travel Regulation; Acceptance of Payment From a non-Federal Source for
Travel Expenses, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,283, 53,285 (1992).
303. An agency's authority to use its gift acceptance statute for travel related expenses
is superseded to the extent that the GSA regulations cover the travel gifts. See supra note
199 and accompanying text.
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vised regulations should ensure that an employee does not necessarily
commit an ethics violation by failing to comply precisely with the rules
governing agency gift acceptance. This current inequity apparently is
based on the assumption that a "failed" agency gift necessarily must be
viewed as a personal gift. Unless the OGE rules permit the gift, the em-
ployee has committed an ethics infraction.
One does not have to condone an employee's noncompliance in order
to dispute this flawed assumption. Surely one must discourage mistakes
in carrying out official duties. Some mistakes even may be actionable
under agency performance requirements or disciplinary procedures. It
does not follow, however, that an employee's failure to comply precisely
with agency gift procedures results in a gift to the employee. Viewing
such gifts as ethics violations seems particularly unfair if the benefit from
this irregularly received gift accrues to the agency. 3 4
The drafters of ethics codes must be especially cognizant of the special
opprobrium that attaches to ethics violations, and particularly to the
charge that employees have accepted improper gifts. Every neglect or
breach of agency procedures does not need to be treated as an ethics
violation.
B. Conclusion
Consolidating and restructuring gift-acceptance authority would make
the code easier for employees to understand. It would encourage the
elimination of arbitrary distinctions. It would promote fairness by achiev-
ing greater consistency in the treatment of comparable gifts. Current
rules limiting the source and amount of gifts, requiring reporting, and
mandating agency conflict-of-interest review differ widely. They should
be reviewed thoroughly to ensure that the regulations consistently apply
adequate safeguards and avoid needless red tape.
The absence of conceptual clarity creates hazardous pitfalls for employ-
ees unfamiliar with the regulatory language. Employees who accept gifts
intending only to benefit their agencies may commit ethical infractions as
well as violations of agency gift acceptance rules. Strict compliance with
the details of the OGE or the GSA rules may be the only way to avoid
this result.
304. The statute authorizing the GSA rules includes specific penalties for employees or
agencies violating the agency gift rules. 31 U.S.C. § 1353 (Supp. V 1993). Treating infrac-
tions of the GSA rules as ethics violations could lead to double punishment. It is question-
able whether Congress intended this result, particularly in light of the statute's clear
division of responsibilities between the OGE and the GSA.
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It is ironic that in providing greater flexibility to accept harmless gifts,
the new code creates a far more dangerous world for employees. The
complexity of the agency and personal gift rules increases the risk that
employees will fail to comply precisely with their requirements. These
failures can result in violations of the ethics code, or even a violation of
section 209. In its attempt to sever the needlessly rigid shackles of the old
model rules, the new code appears to have handed employees a sharp,
but double-edged blade.
Whether section 209 has any continuing raison d'etre is a matter be-
yond the scope of this article. It is hoped, however, that a sharpened and
clarified distinction between personal and agency gifts will serve as the
basis for the new rules interpreting section 209. Such an approach would
bring these rules closer to the past written opinions of the Department of
Justice rather than to those of the OGE.
It would have been far better if the drafters had included their inter-
pretation of section 209 within the language of the gift code to which the
statute is so closely related. Integration would have reduced the possibil-
ity that the interpretations of these two codes eventually will diverge and
come into conflict. In any event, it is hoped that the drafters will monitor
developments carefully to avoid the emergence of an entirely new set of
gotcha catchalls as both codes mature.
This article has proposed specific changes in the gift rules intended to
make them clearer and more accessible. While these changes should
prove useful, an accessible code is possible only if the drafters directly
confront the complexity which is the code's central infirmity. The draft-
ers must address the philosophical and strategic contradictions which are
at the new code's core.
In 1989, the President's Commission on Ethics Law Reform recom-
mended that the OGE consolidate all executive branch standards into a
single code that the agencies could supplement with OGE approval.30 5
The Commission made the following statement in support of its
recommendation:
The Commission believes that the vast majority of federal em-
ployees want to comply with ethical rules. However, the sheer
bulk of ethics statutes and rules, inconsistent rules, and varying
interpretations have contributed greatly to making compliance
difficult. To the extent that rules and interpretations can be
standardized, the rules can be more easily understood and com-
pliance will be facilitated.30 6
305. See Em'ics COMM'N REPORT, supra note 67, at 92-96.
306. Id. at 93.
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The Commission singled out for special criticism the jumble of rules, laws,
and orders relating to the acceptance of meals, entertainment, and
gifts.3" 7 In the Commission's words, "it is frequently difficult to ascertain
precisely what type of conduct is permissible."3 8
It is unfortunate that this report prompted an ethics code which so con-
spicuously fails to address one of the report's central criticisms. If any-
thing, the new code is massively more complex and less accessible than
the system that it replaced.
The drafters labored courageously to develop rules that were "objec-
tive, reasonable, and enforceable. 3 °9 If there is a strategic flaw in their
methodology, it is a failure to recognize sufficiently that while these goals
sometimes conflict with the goal of accessibility, they cannot pursue each
goal independently. It is a failure to appreciate fully the inherent limita-
tions of code drafters and of their audience. It is a failure to seek optimal
success by making appropriate trade-offs among competing goals.
Thomas Morgan has pointed out that ethics laws, like all other legisla-
tion, are a form of government regulation. "Invoking the talisman 'eth-
ics' does not reduce the need for realistic analysis" of justifications and
effects. 310 The assessment must be multidimensional.
A highly sophisticated ethics code will become the victim of its own
subtlety, no matter how successfully it otherwise addresses troublesome
issues. Verbosity will diminish communication. Complexities will pro-
duce inconsistencies that jeopardize the goal of objective regulation.
More detailed rules will increase the demand for even more detailed fact-
based interpretations. There is no reason to believe that those making
these interpretations will be able to treat comparable issues in compara-
ble ways.
A "cookbook" approach to ethics regulation is not realistically possi-
ble. Broad ethics principles inevitably will appear in ethics codes. As
caveats to very specific rules, they will function as gotcha catchalls with
interpretive consequences that may surprise even the drafters. In the
end, their presence will overwhelm the code's purported objectivity and
fatally undermine the only arguable reason for its complexity.
This article does not urge a return to the open-ended subjectivity of
earlier codes. Subjective rules can lead to inconsistent application. Ob-
jective rules also can produce this result, but for different reasons. This
307. Id. at 45.
308. Id. at 46.
309. See Exec. Order No. 12,674, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1990), amended by Exec. Order No.
12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991).
310. Morgan, supra note 11, at 491.
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article does suggest that in their quest for greater objectivity, the drafters
of this code have gone much too far. They have tried to impose a degree
of precision which the subject matter does not allow.
Even without the legislative changes which this article recommends,
much can be done to simplify these rules and make them more intuitive.
In 1961, President Kennedy issued wise counsel:
Criminal statutes and Presidential orders, no matter how care-
fully conceived or meticulously drafted, cannot hope to deal ef-
fectively with every problem of ethical behavior or conflict of
interest. Problems arise in infinite variation. They often involve
subtle and difficult judgments, judgments which are not suited to
generalization or government-wide application.31'
Code drafters must recognize that every effort to make these distinctions,
no matter how reasonable, will affect other drafting goals. It is crucial to
avoid what Alexander Bickel calls "an instinct for the capillaries.
312
Drafters must resist the impulse to tweak the code one last time to pro-
duce just one more reasonable distinction.
The central endeavor of any ethics code is motivating employees to
assume personal responsibility. The drafters cannot achieve this goal if
they entrust the code's secret meaning to the experts. In the end, it is the
underlying principles that matter, and the drafters must not obscure these
principles with unnecessary detail. The quest for an optimum balance is a
difficult one, but in a democracy, all citizens have a vital stake in its
success.
311. Kennedy Special Message, supra note 28, at 333.
312. See William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a Surrogate for
Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REv. 884 n.3 (1985).
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